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"YELLING FIRE" AND HACKING: WHY THE
FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT PERMIT
DISTRIBUTING DVD DECRYPTION
TECHNOLOGY
Bonnie L. Schriefer*
INTRODUCTION
In September 1999, hackers who met over the Internet reverse
engineered a DVD player and discovered the computer program that
"unscrambles" copy-protected DVDs.1 Once unscrambled, hackers
can easily copy DVDs and distribute them over the Internet.2 One of
the hackers, a fifteen-year-old Norwegian named Jon Johansen,'
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Fordham University School of Law. The author would like to
thank her mother for her encouragement, support and friendship.
1. Reports vary as to the number of hackers involved in discovering the
"unscrambling" program and creating the code known as "DeCSS" that decrypts that
program. See Comm. on Intellectual Prop. Rights and the Emerging Info.
Infrastructure and Computer Sci. and Telecomm. Bd. Comm'n on Physical Scis.,
Mathematics, and Applications, Nat'l Research Council, The Digital Dilemma:
Intellectual Property in the Information Age 172 (2000) [hereinafter Nat'l Research
Council] (stating that "two programmers" performed the reverse engineering); see
also Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected
World 189 (Vintage Books 2002) (2001) (stating that "a number" of coders developed
DeCSS); Richard Adams, Guardian, Aug. 8, 2002, at 22 (naming one hacker that
"helped write ... DeCSS"); Benny Evangelista, Digital Dupes, San Francisco Chron.,
Jan. 31, 2000, at Bi (noting that the author of DeCSS was unknown); Amy Harmon,
Free Speech Rights for Computer Code; Suit Tests Power of Media Concerns to
Control Access to Digital Content, N.Y. Times, July 31, 2000, at C1 (claiming that
three people created DeCSS). The court in the Southern District of New York found
that there were three hackers. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, Ill F. Supp.
2d 294, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273
F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
2. See Nat'l Research Council, supra note 1, at 41 ("[R]eplicating digital products
and shipping them via digital networks is cheap, rapid, and easy..."); see also
Evangelista, supra note 1 (describing the Motion Picture Association of America's
fear that DeCSS "open[ed] the door to widespread digital piracy of movies" and
noting that while at the time there were barriers to copying DVDs, "those barriers
could fall over time"); Harmon, supra note 1 (observing that digital technology has
made copying "far easier and less expensive than ever before" and that offers to trade
DVD movies "that have apparently been decoded with DeCSS or other programs"
have begun appearing in Internet chat rooms). But see Lessig, supra note 1, at 189
(arguing that "DeCSS didn't make it any easier to copy DVDs than before ... [or]
increase the likelihood of piracy").
3. Johansen was indicted in January 2002 by Norwegian authorities for his role in
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posted the program on his web site. In a short time, the unscrambling
program (or code), known as DeCSS, was available on many Internet
sites.'
Among those who posted the DeCSS code on their web sites were
Andrew Bunner' and Eric Corley,7 both of whom were sued for doing
so.8 The DVD Copy Control Association ("DVDCCA"), which
regulates the use of the copy protection program applied to DVDs,9
sued Bunner; ' and the major Hollywood movie studios brought an
action against Corley." The basic question in both cases concerned
the legality of posting DeCSS on the Internet. The DVDCCA sought
to end distribution of DeCSS in order to maintain the integrity of its
copy protection code. 2 The movie studios, conversely, were not as
concerned with the code itself as they were with the danger of DeCSS
being used to distribute movies illegally on a Napster-like scale. 3
The courts in both cases found that DeCSS was a form of speech,
creating DeCSS. See Amy Harmon, Technology Briefing Internet: Norway Indicts
Teenage Programmer, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 2002, at C2. A year later, Johansen was
acquitted. The Oslo City Court held that Johansen had the right to view legally
obtained DVDs in whatever way he wanted. See Timothy L. O'Brien, Norwegian
Hacker, 19, Is Acquitted in DVD Piracy Case, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 2003, at C4; see also
Adams, supra note 1 (noting that Johansen helped write DeCSS); Harmon, supra
note 1.
4. See Harmon, supra note 1; see also O'Brien, supra note 3.
5. See Reimerdes, Ill F. Supp. 2d. at 311; see also Benny Evangelista, Court's
DVD Ruling Hailed as Free-Speech Victory; Decision Backs Programmer's Right to
Post Code on the Web, San Francisco Chron., Nov. 2, 2001, at B3; Evangelista, supra
note I (mentioning that DeCSS was "picked up by thousands of Web sites
worldwide"); Harmon, supra note I (noting that "[t]o no one's surprise, the source
code for DeCSS had been widely disseminated across the Internet"); Dave Wilson,
Code Distribution Ruled Free Speech, L.A. Times, Nov. 3, 2001, at Pt. 3, 1.
6. See DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338, 341 (Ct. App.
2001), review granted, 41 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2002) (noting that DeCSS was offered on
defendant's web site "[s]oon after" its appearance on Johansen's web site in October
1999).
7. See Reimerdes, Ill F. Supp. 2d at 303, 312 (noting that defendant "quickly
posted DeCSS" in November 1999).
8. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); Bunner, 113
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 341.
9. See Frequently Asked Questions Page of the DVD CCA Website, at
http://www.dvdcca.org/faq.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2003); see also Bunner, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 341.
10. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 341.
11. Corley, 273 F.3d 429. The studios that brought suit against Corley were
Universal, Paramount, MGM, Tristar, Columbia, Time Warner, Disney and Fox. Id.
12. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 340.
13. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, III F. Supp. 2d 294, 314 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), affd sub nom., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir.
2001). In Reimerdes, the court described plaintiffs' "principal" concern as the
"transmission of pirated copies [of movies] over the Internet," id., and stated that the
"plaintiffs already have been gravely injured. As the pressure for and competition to
supply more and more users with faster and faster network connections grows, the
injury will multiply." Id. at 315; see also Evangelista, supra note 1.
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and so required the court to apply a First Amendment analysis. 4 In
the case against Corley, the Second Circuit applied the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") 15 and prohibited Corley both
from posting the code on his own web site and from providing links to
other sites posting DeCSS.'6 The California Court of Appeal, Sixth
District, applied state trade secrecy law and reversed a preliminary
injunction barring Bunner from posting DeCSS. 7 While neither
ruling is mandatory authority for the other, the fact remains that the
courts came to opposite conclusions on the same basic question."8 The
two cases highlight the uncertainty surrounding the administration of
old laws in the new world of digital technology and the Internet.
While it was once thought that speech would be treated the same way
in digital and online forms as in print, 9 given the nature of these new
technologies, this will not necessarily be the case. The context in
which acts occur must always be considered in the application of laws.
This consideration, though, is not novel. In 1919, the Supreme Court
said, "[t]he character of every act depends upon the circumstances in
which it is done. The most stringent protection of free speech would
not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a
panic.... Such a consideration of context has been evident in many
cases involving activity imbued with speech and non-speech
elements,2 and should continue to be as courts delineate rights and
responsibilities in the digital age.22
14. Corley, 273 F.3d at 449; Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348.
15. Corley, 273 F.3d at 434.
16. Id. at 454-55, 457.
17. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 351-52. The California Supreme Court granted
review of the case against Bunner in February 2002. DVD Copy Control Ass'n v.
Bunner, 41 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2002). Because of the grant of review, the Bunner decision
has been unpublished. See Cal. Ct. R. 976, 977.
18. See Victoria A. Cundiff, Hot Topics in Trade Secrets Law: Keeping Your
Intellectual Property Off the Internet. Two Approaches, 716 PLI/Pat 73, 78 (2002)("The practical effect of either decision remains unclear. Obviously the fact that the
DeCSS code may be freely posted, for the time being, on some web sites, undermines
and most likely destroys the impact of the contrary order in the Corley case."); see
also id. at 75 (noting that the DeCSS cases "leave open a variety of provocative legal
issues"). The Supreme Court was also brought into the DVDCCA's fight against web
sites posting DeCSS. See Paul Sweeting, Court Off DVD Case, Daily Variety, Jan. 6,
2003, at 8.
19. See Adam Cohen, Cyberspeech on Trial, Time, Feb. 15, 1999, at 52.
20. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (citations omitted).
21. See infra notes 154-55, 159 and accompanying text.
22. Other cases involving the rights of copyright owners with respect to online and
digital uses of their works include A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091
(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the provider of a service that facilitated the distribution
of digital audio files over the Internet infringed record companies' copyrights);
Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002) (denying
request for a preliminary injunction; a reasonable jury could find the exclusive right to
publish works in "book form" does not encompass the right to publish those works as
"e-books"); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a
search engine operator's display of plaintiff's copyrighted pictures as "thumbnail"
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This Comment addresses these issues through the lens of the
DeCSS cases. Part I provides a background of the cases against
Bunner and Corley, including a brief description of DVDs and
DeCSS, as well as the legislative histories of both the California trade
secrets law and the DMCA. Part I also gives an overview of free
speech, fair use, and reverse engineering. Part II analyzes the
decisions in the cases against Corley and Bunner. Part III argues that
the California court misconstrued the First Amendment's effect on
that state's trade secret law because it neglected to address whether
that law is content-based or content-neutral. This part also asserts
that the Second Circuit correctly found that the DMCA is content-
neutral, and thus properly determined that free speech interests are
not harmed by enjoining the further distribution of DeCSS. This
Comment concludes that had the California court properly analyzed
the trade secrets law according to the tests developed by the Supreme
Court for determining whether a given law is content-based or
content-neutral, it too would have found that trade secret law does
not impinge the right to free speech.
I. DVDs, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
This part begins by describing the relevant attributes of DVDs and
DeCSS. This part then provides the history of the challenged statutes,
and explains the limits that the First Amendment, the fair use
doctrine, and reverse engineering place on intellectual property
owners.
A. Description of DVDs, CSS and DeCSS
To analyze properly the legal issues underlying the cases against
Bunner and Corley, it is first necessary to understand the various
technologies involved. 3 Digital video disks ("DVDs") are thin disks
images is a fair use); United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (upholding an indictment against the developer of a software program that
disabled publisher's restrictions on the use of its "e-books"); UMG Recordings, Inc. v.
MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that saving audio
recordings in the digital format known as "MP3" is not a transformative use under the
fair use doctrine); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
(granting preliminary injunction barring online bulletin board operators from
facilitating the online exchange of plaintiff's video games).
23. The opinions in DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338
(Ct. App. 2001), review granted, 41 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2002), and Universal City Studios, Inc.
v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd sub nom., Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001), the decision from which Corley
appealed, also provide a helpful explanation of DVDs, CSS and DeCSS. The detailed
background on DVDs and DeCSS provided by Judge Kaplan in Reimerdes can be
found at pages 305-12 of the decision.
2286 [Vol. 71
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similar to compact discs, or CDs, but with a larger storage capacity.24
A single DVD can store enough data to display a full-length movie.
DVDs were developed in late 1995,26 and the major movie studios
began marketing DVD movies to consumers in 1997.27 While the
digital format of DVDs gives them better sound and picture quality
than VHS tapes, 28 DVD technology also "[brings] with it [an]
increased risk of piracy "29 because digital copying is "easy and
inexpensive." '' In addition, copies of digital movies are not
susceptible to the same degradation in quality as video tapes.3
Moreover, digital movies, like other digital content, can be
transmitted worldwide through the Internet with relative ease.32 To
combat these risks, movie studios adopted an encryption technique
known as "Content Scrambling System," or CSS.33 The purpose of
CSS is to prevent DVDs from being copied.34
24. See Nat'l Research Council, supra note 1, at 172; see also Lessig, supra note 1,
at 188. DVDs are also defined as "digital versatile disks." See Reimerdes, 111 F.
Supp. 2d at 307; see also Whatis?com: Digital Versatile Disc, at http://whatis.tech
target.comldefinition/0,,sid9_gci213923,00.html (last updated July 25, 2001).
25. Nat'l Research Council, supra note 1, at 172.
26. Id.
27. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 310. But see Lessig, supra note 1, at 188 (stating
that movies were available on DVD in 1994).
28. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 309. In addition, DVDs "offer[] a combination
of the advantages of digital content (e.g., compactness, low manufacturing cost) and
the advantages of previous distribution media, like books, in which the content is
'bound to' the physical object." Nat'l Research Council, supra note 1, at 15; see also
Lessig, supra note 1, at 188 (noting features of DVDs such as "extreme[] high fidelity
and relative[] compact[ness] ").
29. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 309.
30. Nat'l Research Council, supra note 1, at 31; see also Harmon, supra note 1;
supra note 2 and accompanying text.
31. Nat'l Research Council, supra note 1, at 32 ("[A] digital copy is
indistinguishable from the original as are all successive digital copies."); see also
Lessig, supra note 1, at 98 (describing digital copies as "perfect"); Wilson, supra note
5.
32. See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 313 (noting that while distributing full-
length movies can be "extremely cumbersome," the process can be facilitated through
the use of a program that compresses the size of movies); see also Lessig, supra note 1,
at 98 (describing the fear of intellectual property owners that the Internet would be
used to copy and distribute content for free); Nat'l Research Council, supra note 1, at
221 (noting that digital content such as DVDs "may be distributed more securely
using physical [media] rather than by computer networks" such as the Internet); supra
notes 2, 13 and accompanying text. The music industry dealt with these dangers first
hand with Napster, the file-sharing service that allowed users to download music files.
See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), on remand to
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2001 Copyright L. Rep. $1 28,213 (N.D. Cal.
2001), affd, 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002).
33. Nat'l Research Council, supra note 1, at 172; see also Lessig, supra note 1, at
188-89 (noting that the movie industry developed CSS to protect movies on DVDs);
Evangelista, supra note 1 (stating that CSS was "crucial for the DVD industry to
convince major film studios to trust putting their movies in that format").
34. Nat'l Research Council, supra note 1, at 172; see also Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp.
2d at 308 (describing CSS as "an access control and copy prevention system for
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In conjunction with adopting CSS as a protective measure, the
studios established a licensing system administered by the
DVDCCA.35  The DVDCCA's license agreements included
confidentiality obligations.36 As the major studios only make CSS-
protected DVDs, the effect of the studios' licensing system is that any
manufacturer wishing to make a DVD-player must license CSS from
the DVDCCA so that its machines can play the majority of DVDs
available to consumers.37
Despite these efforts at controlling the distribution of CSS,
Johansen and the people whom he "met" online discovered the CSS
encryption algorithm through reverse engineering." This reverse
engineering allowed the hackers to create the software program (or
code39 ) that became known as DeCSS.40 DeCSS "unlocks" CSS-
DVDs"). Judge Kaplan explained: "A CSS-protected DVD can be decrypted by an
appropriate decryption algorithm that employs a series of keys stored on the DVD
and the DVD player. In consequence, only players and drives containing the
appropriate keys are able to decrypt DVD files and thereby play movies stored on
DVDs." Id. at 310. Another definition of CSS is: "a data encryption and
authentication method used to protect [DVDs] from being illegally copied,
distributed and viewed from other devices." See Whatis?com: Content Scrambling
System, at http://search security.techtarget.com/Definition/0,,sid14-gci2l4575,00.html
(last updated July 24, 2001). On its web site, the DVDCCA describes CSS as a means
of preventing "movies from being illegally duplicated." See Frequently Asked
Questions Page of the DVD CCA Website, at http://www.dvdcca.org/faq.html (last
visited Feb. 19, 2003). One version of the DVDCCA's license agreement defines CSS
as a system "designed to provide reasonable protection for" DVDs. § 1.8 of Version
1.2 of the CSS License Agreement, available at http://www.dvdcca.org/css (last visited
Feb. 19, 2003). But see Lessig, supra note 1, at 189. Lessig claims that CSS "didn't
interfere with the ability to copy DVD disks.... All it did was limit the range of
machines that DVD disks could be played on." Id. This assertion is not disputed.
The key issue is that the DVDCCA's license agreements do not refer to DVD players
that allow copying; the agreements only refer to players that play DVDs. See, e.g., §
6.2.1 of the CSS Procedural Specifications, available at http://www.dvdcca.org/css (last
visited Feb. 19, 2003). Thus, DVD players that can copy DVDs would not be licensed
by the DVDCCA. Moreover, the DVDCCA requires that its licensees' DVD players
not play pirate copies of DVDs. See § 6.2.1.5 of the CSS Procedural Specifications,
available at http://www.dvdcca.org/css (last visited Feb. 19, 2003).
35. See Frequently Asked Questions Page of the DVD CCA Website, at
http://www.dvdcca.org/faq.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2003); see also Reimerdes 111 F.
Supp. 2d at 310; Lessig, supra note 1, at 189 (stating that licenses to use CSS "were
issued by the consortium that developed and deployed CSS," that is, the DVDCCA).
36. See, e.g., §§ 1.6, 1.17 and 5.2 of Version 1.2 of the CSS License Agreement,
available at http://www.dvdcca.org/css (last visited Feb. 19, 2003); see DVD Copy
Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338, 341 (Ct. App. 2001), review granted,
41 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2002).
37. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 341; see also Nat'l Research Council, supra note
1, at 169 ("The hardware and software for a player must use [CSS] . .. in order to be
capable of playing movies."); see also Lessig, supra note 1, at 189.
38. See supra note 1. For a description of reverse engineering, see infra Part
l.B.3.c.
39. Software programs are written in code, see Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 446 (2d Cir. 2001), although the terms can be used
interchangeably. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 1, at 35. Lessig offers the following
description of code:
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protected DVDs, allowing the DVDs to be copied and played on
"non-compliant" DVD players.4' None of the hackers was licensed by
"Code" is written (primarily) by humans, though the code that humans write
is quite unlike the code that computers run. Humans write "source code";
computers run "object code." Source code is a fairly understandable
collection of logical languages designed to instruct the computer what it
should do. Object code is a string of ones and zeros impenetrable to the
ordinary human. Source code, however, is too cumbersome for a computer
to run; it is therefore "compiled" before it is run, meaning translated from
human-readable to machine-understandable code.
Id. at 50. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a compiler as "[a] routine for
translating a program into a machine-coded form." Oxford English Dictionary, Vol.
III, 606 (2d ed. 1989). "Code" has also been defined as "a term used for both the
statements written in a particular programming language-the source code, and a
term for the source code after it has been processed by a compiler and made ready to
run in the computer-the object code." See Whatis?com: Code, at http://search390.
techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sidl0_gci2l3934,00.html (last updated Aug. 21, 2001);
see also Corley, 273 F.3d at 446 ("[P]rograms are essentially instructions to a
computer."). Lessig later describes code as "performative; what it says, it does" and
also notes that code may "perform[] as well as express[]." Lessig, supra note 1, at 57-
58. The Copyright Act's definition of "computer program" recognizes that inherent
functionality. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a computer program as "a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a
certain result"). "Code" is also a verb meaning to write programs. See Whatis?com:
Code, at http:// search390.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid1 0_gci213934,00.html (last
updated Aug. 21, 2001). The distinction between the two kinds of code was important
to the Bunner court. See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
40. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 311; see also supra note 1 and accompanying
text. The Second Circuit defined "hackers" as "a digital-era term often applied to
those interested in techniques for circumventing protections of computers and
computer data from unauthorized access." Corley, 273 F.3d at 435. However, there
are different definitions of hackers, with a range of connotations. See Whatis?com:
Hacker, at http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid1.4_gci212220,00.html
(last updated June 12, 2001) (describing a hacker as either "a clever programmer" or
,.someone who tries to break into computer systems"). For example, Webster's
Dictionary has defined the term as "a talented amateur user of computers,
specif[ically] one who attempts to gain unauthorized access to files in various
systems." Webster's New World College Dictionary 605 (3d ed. 1996). The National
Research Council does not refer to hacking, but instead describes the actions of
people such as Johansen as "breaking" or "cracking" a code. Nat'l Research Council,
supra note 1, at 172, 221. Similarly, Lessig describes "open source coders" that
"cracked" CSS. Lessig, supra note 1, at 189. In other contexts, Lessig describes
"coders" and "authors" that "disabled" a software program called Cyber Patrol. Id. at
184.
41. Reimerdes, Ill F. Supp. 2d at 311; see also Lessig, supra note 1, at 189 (arguing
that the fact that CSS "limit[ed] the range of machines that DVD disks could be
played on .... gave rise to the need for a [program that could] crack" CSS); Adams,
supra note 1 (noting that DeCSS allows end-users to play DVDs on the Linux
computer operating system, and at the time there were no DVDCCA-licensed, Linux-
compatible DVD players); Evangelista, supra note 1 (stating that "Linux supporters
say they had no choice but to hack because the DVD industry has only licensed
devices that play back DVDs on machines using Windows or Macintosh operating
systems"; but further noting that no manufacturer applied with the DVDCCA to
make a Linux-compatible DVD player); Harmon, supra note 3. But see Intergraph
Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("[M]arket power does not
'impose on the intellectual property owner an obligation to license the use of that
property to others."' (citation omitted)).
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the DVDCCA.42 Before long, DeCSS was widely available on the
Internet,43 including on the web sites of the respective defendants in
Bunner" and the Universal cases.4 5
The widespread availability of DeCSS led the DVDCCA and the
movie studios to bring claims against Bunner, Corley, and others.46
The DVDCCA claimed that Bunner misappropriated its confidential
and proprietary information and was thus liable under California's
trade secrets law.47 The movie studios alleged that Corley violated the
anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act.48 These laws and their legislative histories are described in the
next section.
B. Legislative History of the UTSA and DMCA
Owners of intellectual property4' have a variety of laws at their
disposal to help them preserve the value of the property."' Owners
42. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 311; see also Evangelista, supra note 1 (quoting
the DVDCCA as saying that CSS "is available for license to anyone wishing to
produce a Linux DVD player"). In fact, according to the DVDCCA's web site,
Linux-compatible DVD players with CSS are now available. Frequently Asked
Questions Page of the DVD CCA Website, at http://www.dvdcca.org/faq.html (last
visited Feb. 19, 2003).
43. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 311; see also supra note 5 and accompanying
text.
44. DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 338, 341 (Ct. App.
2001), review granted, 41 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2002).
45. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d. at 303, 312.
46. See Evangelista, supra note 5 (noting that the DVDCCA sued seventy web
site operators and 500 unnamed people); see also Lessig, supra note 1, at 189
(claiming that "upon the release of DeCSS, the industry went nuts").
47. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 341.
48. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 303, 312.
49. What intellectual property is and how the law should handle questions of its
ownership are complex issues. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Prior Restraints and
Intellectual Property: The Clash Between Intellectual Property and the First
Amendment from an Economic Perspective, 12 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Ent.
L. 1, 13 (2001) (defining intellectual property broadly as "intangible information ...
[that] has economic value in the marketplace in the same way that tangible assets and
real property have economic value"); see also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989
F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (describing intellectual property as private property,
but further arguing that leaving too much intellectual property in private control can
lead to a less "rich public domain"); Lessig, supra note 1, at 97 n.26 (describing the
origins of the term "intellectual property"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual
Property Is Still Property, 13 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 108, 118 (1990) (arguing that
intellectual property and physical property should be treated the same way by the
law); Wendy J. Gordon, Assertive Modesty: An Economics of Intangibles, 94 Colum.
L. Rev. 2579, 2579 n.1 (1994) (referring to intellectual property as "a mode of
converting mental labor into a 'vendible commodity'); Dale A. Nance, Owning
Ideas, 13 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 757, 757 (1990) (describing intellectual property as
"rights to novel ideas as contained in tangible products of cognitive effort"); About
WIPO, at http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/ (the web site of the World Intellectual
Property Organization ("WIPO")) (last visited Feb. 19, 2003) (calling "works of the
human spirit" intellectual property). Intellectual property must be unique in some
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have sought protection of their rights through trade secrecy, patents,
copyrights, and other legislation tailored to their particular
industries." In the DeCSS cases, for example, the DVDCCA tried to
stop distribution of DeCSS through state trade secret law,52 while
Universal and the other studios did the same by invoking the DMCA,
a federal copyright and anti-circumvention statute. 3 The following
sections provide background on California's trade secrecy statute and
the federal copyright laws, and address the various exceptions to these
laws.
1. California Trade Secrets Law
In 1984, California enacted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 4
("UTSA") to protect trade secrets from misappropriation.
way to be protected by the law. See, e.g., Nadel v. Play-By-Play Toys & Novelties,
Inc., 208 F.3d 368, 380 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[U]noriginal, known ideas have no value as
property and the law does not protect against the use of that which is free and
available to all."). With respect to copyright law in particular, the aim is to protect
creative works more so than fact-based works, see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510
U.S. 569, 586 (1994). But see Lessig, supra note 1, at 97, 237 (claiming that it is wrong
to view intellectual property like "cars and homes"; instead it should be considered a
resource to be shared by the creator of the intellectual property and the general
public).
50. See David L. Hitchcock & Kathy E. Needleman, Current Status of Copyright
Protection in the Digital Age and Related Topics, 8 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 539, 560
(2002). Hitchcock and Needleman state:
The Internet has resulted in such a merger of technology, content, and value
that creative advocates have brought to bear a wide variety of other laws
[besides copyright law]. These include: criminal statutes related to
computers and personal information, contract, right of privacy, right of
publicity, trespass, unfair competition, unjust enrichment, and trade secrets.
Id.
51. Id.; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 782 (2003) (finding that the
term of copyright protection was extended in 1998 due to "international concerns,...
demographic, economic, and technological changes... and rationally credited
projections that longer terms would encourage copyright holders to invest in the
restoration and public distribution of their works"); id. at 796 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting that "[s]ince the creation of federal patent and copyright protection in 1790,
Congress has passed a variety of legislation, both providing specific relief for
individual authors and inventors as well as changing the general statutes conferring
patent and copyright privileges"); Lessig, supra note 1, at 95-96 (noting that
"controlling" intellectual resources can be achieved "through law, norms, the market,
or, importantly, technology"); James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic
Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 Vand. L. Rev.
2007, 2010 (2000) (noting that over the last twenty years, intellectual property law has
been "broadened to cover more subjects, deepened to cover them for a longer time,
widened to cover them in more ways"); Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer,
The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 Yale L.J. 1575, 1578 (2002)
(reviewing, inter alia, state anti-plug mold legislation, the federal Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act, 17 U.S.C. § 901-14, the DMCA and the UTSA).
52. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 340.
53. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
54. Cal. Civ. Code § 3426-3426.11 (West 1997).
55. See Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 346; see also Linda B. Samuels & Bryan K.
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Misappropriation is the acquisition of someone else's proprietary
information through improper means;16 reverse engineering is not
considered misappropriation. Furthermore, misappropriation is "an
intentional tort"5 and "is not limited to the initial act of improperly
acquiring trade secrets; the use and continuing use of trade secrets is
also misappropriation. '"5 9 Before a court can protect information,
however, it must determine whether that information is a trade secret.
In California, a trade secret has three key characteristics: "(a)
information (b) which is valuable because unknown to others and (c)
which the owner has attempted to keep secret.161 Moreover, such
Johnson, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act. The States' Response, 24 Creighton L. Rev.
49, 52 (1990) (noting that California's UTSA is based on the 1979 and 1985 versions
of the National Conference of Commissioners' Uniform Trade Secrets Act). But see
Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc. 822 F. Supp. 634, 651-52 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (stating
that California's UTSA focuses on preserving relationships of confidence and trust,
rather than on protecting the economic value of trade secrets). Regarding trade
secrets generally, see Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets
Act, 8 Harvard J.L. & Tech. 427, 432-36 (1995) (describing the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws as
a "model" for trade secret protection); see also Robert Unikel, Bridging the "Trade
Secret" Gap: Protecting "Confidential Information" Not Rising to the Level of Trade
Secrets, 29 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 841, 842 (1998) (noting that trade secret law "has served
as one of the most potent and widely-used legal mechanisms for the protection of
commercially valuable knowledge"). In California, misappropriation means:
(1) Acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has
reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or (2)
Disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied
consent by a person who:
(A) Used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
(B) At the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his or
her knowledge of the trade secret was: (i) Derived from or through a person
who had utilized improper means to acquire it; (ii) Acquired under
circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(iii) Derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person
seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(C) Before a material change of his or her position, knew or had reason to
know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired
by accident or mistake.
Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1(b); see also Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 Duke L.J. 147, 229-30 (1998)
(arguing that misappropriation is narrowly defined, but that the definition of trade
secrets is "extremely broad").
56. Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1(b).
57. Id. § 3426.1(a) (defining improper means to include "theft, bribery,
misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or
espionage through electronic or other means" and stating that "[r]everse engineering
or independent derivation alone shall not be considered improper means"). For a
description of reverse engineering, see infra Part I.B.3.c.
58. PMC, Inc. v. Kadisha, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663, 673 (Ct. App. 2000).
59. Id. at 675 (internal citations omitted).
60. ABBA Rubber Co. v. Seaquist, 286 Cal. Rptr. 518, 526 (Ct. App. 1991)
(citations omitted). The UTSA defines a trade secret as:
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process, that:
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information can be a trade secret even if it is "readily ascertainable."'"
The California legislature intentionally avoided a "not readily
ascertainable" requirement for trade secret status in order to provide
a clear standard and to avoid arguments over the amount of time
needed to ascertain a secret.6 2 Thus, under California law, a trade
secret includes information "which the industry could easily discover"
but not "information that the industry already knows."63 The second
element -economic value-exists if either the owner of the
information or a third party who obtains the information considers the
information to have such value.64
Once the determination is made that a trade secret was
misappropriated (i.e., the court concludes that the information is a
trade secret and the information was acquired through improper
means), the court must provide an adequate remedy to preserve the
fact's secrecy.65 The UTSA provides that "[a]ctual or threatened
misappropriation may be enjoined."" The Act further protects
(1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic
value from its disclosure or use; and
(2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1(d). The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, by
contrast, eliminates the responsibility of the owner to keep the information secret.
According to the Restatement, a trade secret is "any information that can be used in
the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and
secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others." Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 (1995). But see R. Milgrim, Milgrim on Trade
Secrets § 2.01 (1992) (denying trade secret protection to "well known or readily
ascertainable" information).
61. ABBA Rubber Co., 286 Cal. Rptr. at 528. Conversely, the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws includes a requirement that the trade secret not be "readily
ascertainable." 14 West's Unif. Laws Ann., Unif. Trade Secrets Act, § 1(4)(i) (1990);
see also Milgrim, supra note 60, at § 2.01.
62. See ABBA Rubber Co., 286 Cal. Rptr. at 528.
63. Id. at 529 (emphasis added).
64. Courtesy Temporary Serv., Inc. v. Camacho, 272 Cal. Rptr. 352, 358 (1990).
65. Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.2(a).
66. Id.; see also Susan Burnett Luten, California Civil Litigation 456 (3d ed. 1997)
(stating that in California, "a preliminary injunction... preserves the status quo until
a trial can be held on the underlying dispute" and that "[t]his type of injunction is a
determination of the trial court that the status quo should continue until trial");
Lemley & Volokh, supra note 55, at 229 (maintaining that preliminary injunctions are
common in trade secret cases, due in part to the "fragility of trade secret protection-
public disclosure forever destroys the secret, so the harm from unauthorized
disclosure is 'irreparable' in a sense absent in most copyright or trademark cases");
Michael W. Shiver Jr., Comment, Objective Limitations, or How the Vigorous
Application of "Strong Form" Idea/Expression Dichotomy Theory in Copyright
Preliminary Injunction Hearings Might Just Save the First Amendment, 9 UCLA Ent.
L. Rev. 361, 362 (2002) (noting that while there is "serious dispute as to whether
preliminary injunctions issued in copyright cases are, in fact, prior restraints on
speech," it is generally agreed that injunctions in trade secret cases are not prior
restraints).
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owners of trade secrets through its requirement that a court use
reasonable measures to protect an alleged trade secret in connection
with a trial.6" For instance, actual or threatened misappropriation
"may be enjoined ... and [the plaintiff] may recover damages for
unjust enrichment, or receive payment of a reasonable royalty."68 As
in Bunner, California appellate courts have reversed preliminary
injunctions granted by trial courts that barred further disclosure of
proprietary information.69
On the other hand, courts upheld injunctions when the injunctions
were tailored to the harm caused by misappropriation. In a case
concerning proprietary customer data, for example, an injunction was
upheld against the defendants' argument that it was "overbroad and
unjustified. 117 The California Court of Appeal, First District, found
that "the injunction correctly [drew] the line '71 because it did not
apply to customers of the data owner with whom the defendants,
former employees of the data owner, had no contact.72
In contrast to DVDCCA's decision to enforce its rights through
trade secrecy law, the movie studios in the Universal cases sought to
stop the use of DeCSS to distribute pirated movies through federal
anti-circumvention law. 73 The movie studios did not claim that Corley
infringed any copyrighted work, but rather alleged that Corley
trafficked an anti-circumvention device when he posted and linked to
DeCSS.7 4 Such trafficking violates the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act,75 a 1998 addition to federal copyright law.76
67. Cal Civ. Code § 3426.5. Such measures "may include granting protective
orders in connection with discovery proceedings, holding in-camera hearings, sealing
the records of the action, and ordering any person involved in the litigation not to
disclose an alleged trade secret without prior court approval." Id.
68. PMC Inc. v. Kadisha, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663, 673 (Ct. App. 2000) (citations
omitted).
69. See, e.g., Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Ins. Servs. of Orange County, Inc. v. Robb,
39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 887 (Ct. App. 1995). Robb reversed a lower court's preliminary
injunction prohibiting a former employee of an insurance company from using the
company's customer lists and other customer information. Id. at 892. Even if the lists
and information were trade secrets, the court determined that the employee did not
misuse them when he lawfully informed the company's clients that he was taking a
new job at another insurance company. Id.
70. Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 739 (Ct. App. 1997).
71. Id. at 740.
72. Id. This tailoring is comparable to the injunction granted in Bunner, as the
injunction there prohibited Bunner from posting DeCSS but not from providing links
to other web sites containing DeCSS. DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 338, 344 (Ct. App. 2001), review granted, 41 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2002).
73. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 303, 316
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429
(2d Cir. 2001). New York does not have a trade secret law comparable to that of
California, but trade secrets may be protected under the common law. See, e.g.,
Lemelson v. Carolina Enters., Inc., 541 F. Supp. 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
74. Reimerdes, III F. Supp. 2d at 316-17.
75. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000).
76. Id.
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2. The Copyright Act
Modern American copyright law finds its origins in the Statute of
Anne,77 passed by the English Parliament in 1709 "for the
encouragement of learned men to compose and write useful books."7 8
The United States Constitution, in turn, grants Congress the power
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries."79
a. Copyright Law Generally
Congress exercised its constitutional power through its passage of
the Copyright Act."' The Copyright Act provides that copyright
protection exists "in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression."'" Unlike trade secrets, copyrights do not, in
any case, "extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery."82  The Copyright Act
grants the owner of a copyrighted work certain exclusive rights 3 that
the owner may exercise during the life of the copyright.84 Like other
77. See Craig Joyce et al., Copyright Law 20 (5th ed. 2001); see also Fred Fisher
Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 647-48 (1943).
78. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
79. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Twentieth Century Fox Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (stating that "private motivation must ultimately
serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the
other arts"); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (describing the main
purpose of copyright as providing the public with "the general benefits derived...
from the labors of the authors").
80. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (2000); see also Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (noting that the Copyright Clause gives Congress the
power to define the scope of copyright protection); Graham v. John Deere Co. of
Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) (describing the Copyright Clause as "both a grant of
power [to] and a limitation" on Congress).
81. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
82. Id. § 102(b). This clause has been interpreted to require creativity on the part
of the author for a work to be protected by copyright. See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991) (finding that the distinction between
facts and creative expression "limits severely the scope of protection in fact-based
works"). Patents may be granted to protect non-copyrightable expressions such as
processes. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-376 (2000).
83. 17 U.S.C. § 106. Among these are the rights to: (1) reproduce the work; (2)
prepare derivative works; (3) distribute copies of the work by sale or otherwise; (4)
perform an audiovisual work publicly; (5) display the work publicly; and (6) perform a
sound recording publicly by a digital audio transmission. Id. § 106(1)-(6). A
derivative work is defined in the statute as "a work based upon one or more
preexisting works." Id. § 101. The right to publicly perform an audiovisual work
applies to "literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
motion pictures and other audiovisual works." Id. § 106(4).
84. Id. §§ 302-304. Copyright protection generally lasts for the life of the author
plus seventy years. Id. § 302(a).
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property rights, 5 these rights may be sold, assigned or licensed to
third parties by the copyright owner. 6  If any of these rights are
infringed by a third party, the author may seek damages or injunctive
relief.87 However, the exclusive rights are subject to the fair use
doctrine,s8 which is embodied in Section 107 of the Copyright Act. 9
Fair use permits third parties to make certain uses of copyrighted
works without risking liability for infringement."° The doctrine
balances the First Amendment right to free speech against the
exclusive rights guaranteed to authors by the Constitution." Section
107 lists four factors to be considered in determining whether any
particular use of a copyrighted work is a fair use: (1) the purpose of
the use (e.g., whether the use is commercial); (2) the nature of the
work used; (3) the amount of the work used; and (4) the effect of the
use on the market for the work.92 Although these factors are not
85. See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 49, at 19 n.88 (noting that businesses "can
use intellectual property in the form of inventions, trade secrets, or technological
know-how to create products that can be sold in the marketplace"); see also supra
note 49.
86. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d).
87. Id. §§ 502-505. But see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10
(1994) (noting that copyright's purpose is "not always best served by automatically
granting injunctive relief").
88. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (stating that the exclusive rights granted are subject to, inter
alia, Section 107 of the Copyright Act); see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 154-55 (1975) (holding that "'the Copyright Act does not give a
copyright holder control over all uses of his copyrighted work"' (citation omitted)).
89. 17 U.S.C. § 107. The section is entitled: "Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair
use." Id.
90. Id.
91. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 788 (2003) (noting that copyright law
"incorporates... speech-protective purposes and safeguards" and "contains built-in
First Amendment accommodations"); see also Harper and Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556, 560 (1985) (rejecting argument that when the
speech at issue regards "'matters of high public concern"' (citation omitted), the First
Amendment requires the scope of fair use to be wider than usual because "the
Copyright Act's distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable
facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded
by fair use" offer adequate First Amendment protection); A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that "First Amendment
concerns in copyright are allayed by the... fair use doctrine"), affd, 284 F.3d 1091
(9th Cir. 2002); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc.,
923 F. Supp. 1231, 1.258 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Lessig, supra note 1, at 105, 188 (describing
fair use as a required constitutional limit on the control granted to authors by the
Copyright Act); Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 49, at 5 ("Existing limitations in
[copyright] law already strike a balance between protecting the property interests
while minimizing the impact on free speech rights."). Fair use is further described
below. See infra Part I.B.3.b.
92. 17 U.S.C. § 107. The four factors listed in the statute are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of
the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
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exhaustive and other relevant factors may be considered, 93 courts
mainly rely on the four factors enumerated in the statute.94 While the
doctrine was not codified until 1976, the concept of fair use has existed
since the beginnings of copyright law. Nearly twenty years after fair
use was made law, the Supreme Court noted that "[f]rom the infancy
of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted
materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright's very
purpose."95 Even so, there is disagreement as to whether fair use is a
defense to an infringement claim or an affirmative right to use
copyrighted works in certain situations.96
While the Copyright Act's definition of works of authorship does
not specifically mention computer programs such as CSS and DeCSS,
the legislative history indicates that Congress considered computer
programs to be literary works and copyrightable as such.97 As early as
1.981, federal district courts held that computer programs were
entitled to copyright protection.9" Despite these rulings and the
Id. The "purpose and character of the use" has been described as determining
"whether and to what extent the new work is 'transformative."' Campbell, 510 U.S. at
579. In addition, a work need not be sold by the alleged infringer for the use to be
commercial in nature. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1015. Copying a work in its entirety
weighs against a finding of fair use, see id. at 1016, but is not determinative. See Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1984). If a use is
commercial, market harm is presumed; if the use is not commercial, the harm must be
shown. See id. at 451. Moreover, the relevant market may be an existing or future
market. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1017.
93. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (stating that the "factors to be considered shall include" the
four described in § 107); id. § 101 (defining the term "including" as "illustrative and
not limitative").
94. 1 Michael Landau, Lindey on Entertainment, Publishing and the Arts
LD.01 [1[e], LD-26.3 (2d ed. 2002).
95. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575. The Campbell Court relied on the English case of
Cary v. Kearsley, 170 Eng. Rep. 679 (K.B. 1802) to support its proposition. In that
case, the court did not use the term "fair use" but instead held that "a man may fairly
adopt part of the work of another... for the promotion of science, and the benefit of
the public." Id. at 680; see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 576 (stating that "fair
abridgements" were permissible under the Statute of Anne).
96. Nat'l Research Council, supra note 1, at 5; see also Joyce et al., supra note 77,
at 807 (describing fair use as an affirmative defense); Lessig, supra note 1, at 105
(calling fair use a defense); infra Part I.B.3.b.
97. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 at 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5667 (noting that the term "literary works" "includes computer programs to the
extent that they incorporate authorship in the programmer's expression of original
ideas"). The Copyright Act defines a "computer program" as: "a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a
certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101; see also Lessig, supra note 1, at 252 (arguing that the
term of copyright protection for software programs "is a parody of the Constitution's
requirement that copyright be for 'limited times'). But see Arthur R. Miller,
Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated
Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 977, 979 (1993)
(contending that "Congress[] decided to avoid grappling with technological issues that
obviously required more study than the legislative process was then willing to give
them").
98. See Tandy Corp. v. Pers. Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal.
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legislative intent to provide computer programs with the protection of
copyright law, subsequent courts have grappled with the question of
whether some elements of a computer program fall outside the realm
of copyrightable works.99
The Copyright Act also contains special provisions related to
computer programs that are inapplicable to traditional works. For
example, Section 109 of the Act prohibits the rental or lease of
computer programs.1 ... With this provision, Congress addressed the
facts that computer programs can be copied easily and that the main
reason people would borrow computer programs would be to make
illegal copies of them. 1°
Moreover, the Copyright Act includes provisions directed at the
needs of owners of individual copies of computer programs, known as
end-users.) 2 Section 117 of the Act allows end-users to copy a
computer program for archival or maintenance purposes." 3 Despite
1981) (holding that a computer program embodied in a silicon chip is a work of
authorship). This proposition was confirmed in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula
Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983), which held that computer operating
system programs are copyrightable; see also Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc.,
685 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that "the copyrightability of computer
programs is firmly established"). The legislative history of the Copyright Act
supports this decision. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
99. See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993)
(holding that courts must separate the various elements of a computer program to
determine which are protectable in deciding whether infringement occurred; non-
protected elements of a computer program may be copied without liability); see also
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 51 (D. Mass. 1990)
(holding that the "literal and nonliteral" elements of a computer program may be
copyrightable). A copyrighted work containing unprotectable elements is not unique
to computer programs. See, e.g., Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d
841, 849 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Copyrightable material often contains uncopyrightable
elements within it."); see also Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
350 (1991) (holding that fact-based works have limited copyright protection).
100. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A). This prohibition also applies to phonorecords, and
for much the same reasons. Id.; see also Joyce et al., supra note 77, at 541 (describing
the rental prohibitions against both computer programs and records).
101. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659; see
also 17 U.S.C. § 117(b) (providing that a computer program may be leased or sold
"only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights in the program"). These
provisions are in contrast to the first sale doctrine that applies to other copyrighted
works, such as books. The first sale doctrine is codified in Section 109(a) of the
Copyright Act as follows: "the owner of a particular copy ... lawfully made under this
title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy." Id. §
109(a) (emphasis added).
102. "End user" means "the person for whom a hardware or software product is
designed." Whatis?com: End User, at http://whatis. techtarget.com/definition/
0,,sid9_gci212063,00.html (last updated May 30, 2002). In a more traditional context,
"end use" is defined as "the ultimate specific use to which a manufactured product (as
paper) is put or restricted." Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the
English Language Unabridged 750 (1993). An "end-user" may therefore be seen as
the consumer of that product.
103. 17 U.S.C. § 117(a), (c).
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Congressional attempts to protect computer programs through
traditional copyright law, as new technological developments rapidly
occurred, intellectual property owners looked to the federal
legislature to provide them with better defenses against infringement
in the digital age."'4 Congress responded by passing the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") on October 28, 1998.1"5
b. Digital Millennium Copyright Act
The DMCA implemented the World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIPO") Copyright Treaty and the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty'0 6 (collectively, the "WIPO
Treaties").' WIPO is a branch of the United Nations dedicated to
promoting and protecting intellectual property.0 8 The WIPO Treaties
were based on American proposals drafted for the 1996 WIPO
Conference.0 9  In December 1996, WIPO adopted the WIPO
Treaties."" The United States signed the treaties in April 1997.11
104. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text; see also Nat'l Research Council,
supra note 1, at 105 (stating that Congress "heeded the concerns of major copyright
industry groups about the dangers" of circumvention); Lessig, supra note 1, at 98
(noting that there was a fear that the Internet would "render useless the rights
granted by law" and that this fear "led Congress to expand the rights protected by the
Copyright Act"). Lessig believes Congress's response ought to be more balanced, as
it traditionally has been: "Congress has historically struck a balance between
[compensating copyright owners] and assuring that an adequate range of material
remains in the public domain"; this has been "especially true when Congress has
confronted new technologies." Id. at 108; see also infra notes 107, 206 and
accompanying text.
105. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000). In Senator Patrick Leahy's testimony before
the Senate endorsing the DMCA, he stated that the DMCA
is a product of our recognition that the digital age presents us with
unprecedented challenges to copyright protection.... [W]ith consideration
of the DMCA[,] the Senate takes another historic step toward protecting
American ingenuity and creative expression. This bill is a well-balanced
package of proposals that address the needs of creators, consumers and
commerce in the digital age and well into the next century.
Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, Senate Judiciary Comm. On
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, available at 1998 WL 11518135 [hereinafter
Leahy Statement]. Senator Leahy (D-VT) has been in office since 1974. See About
the Senator, at http://leahy.senate.gov/biography/index.html (last visited Feb. 19,
2003). Senator Leahy was a sponsor, along with Senator Orrin Hatch, of the DMCA.
See Leahy Statement, supra.
106. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, Title 1 (1998).
107. See Leahy Statement, supra note 105; see also Lessig, supra note 1, at 330 n.14
(describing the WIPO Treaties); David Nimmer, Appreciating Legislative History:
The Sweet and Sour Spots of the DMCA's Commentary, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 909, 915
(2002).
108. See About WIPO, at http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/ (last visited Feb. 19,
2003).
109. Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 Va. J. Int'l L. 369,
410-12 (1997) (discussing the copyright treaty drafted by the Clinton administration
for the 1996 WIPO Conference).
110. The World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") Copyright Treaty
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The DMCA contains five sections. Section 1201 prohibits the
circumvention of copyright protection systems,1 2 while also providing
several exemptions to the prohibition. The exemptions are for
purposes including education, research, reverse engineering, law
enforcement, privacy, security, and the protection of minors.'13
Section 1202 covers the integrity of copyright management
information."4  Sections 1203 and 1204, respectively, provide the
available civil and criminal remedies." 5 Lastly, Section 1205 is the
DMCA's savings clause, which states that the DMCA does not affect
the right to privacy "in connection with the ... use of the Internet..."6
A common criticism of the DMCA is that it, unlike the Copyright
Act,117 does not contain a fair use clause.'" In addition to the
exemptions described above, however, the DMCA explicitly states
and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty are available at
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo033en.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2003) and
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo034en.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2003),
respectively.
11. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, Title 1 (1998).
112. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000). Specifically, the DMCA states that "[n]o person
shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under this title." Id. § 1201(a)(I)(A). "Effective control" is defined in the
Act as a measure that "in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the application
of information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner,
to gain access to the work." Id. § 1201(a)(3)(B). The DMCA further provides that
[n]o person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or
otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or
part thereof, that-(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of
circumventing protection [or] (B) has only limited commercially significant
purpose or use other than to circumvent protection.
Id. § 1201(b)(1).
113. Id. § 1201(d)-(j). The DMCA defines "encryption research" as "activities
necessary to identify and analyze flaws and vulnerabilities of encryption technologies
applied to copyrighted works, if these activities are conducted to advance the state of
knowledge in the field of encryption technology or to assist in the development of
encryption products." Id. § 1201 (g)(1)(A). "Security testing" is defined as "accessing
a computer, computer system, or computer network, solely for the purpose of good
faith testing, investigating, or correcting, a security flaw or vulnerability, with the
authorization of the owner or operator of such computer, computer system, or
computer network." Id. § 1201 (j)(1).
114. Id. § 1202.
115. Id. § 1203-1204.
116. Id. § 1205 (providing that nothing in the DMCA "abrogates, diminishes, or
weakens the provisions of, nor provides any defense or element of mitigation in a
criminal prosecution or civil action under, any Federal or State law that prevents the
violation of the privacy of an individual in connection with the individual's use of the
Internet").
117. See id. §§ 107.
118. See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 107, at 932; see also Eric J. Sinrod, Fallout Rains
From Digital Copyright Act, N.Y. L.J., June 4, 2002, at 5 (describing report published
by the Electronic Frontier Foundation which stated that the DMCA has "stifle[d] a
wide array of legitimate activities"); Chris Taylor, Throwing the e-Book At Him,
Time, Aug. 20, 2001, at 63 (quoting a technology company CEO as saying the DMCA
may "trample[] on" fair use).
DVD DECRYPTION TECHNOLOGY
that existing defenses to copyright infringement claims, including fair
use, remain valid under the DMCA. 119
After passage of the DMCA, Senator Patrick Leahy testified before
the Senate that the WIPO Treaties "fortify intellectual property rights
around the world." 120  Senator Orrin Hatch, Senator Leahy's co-
sponsor of the DMCA, similarly stated: "The DMCA is the most
comprehensive bill that has come before the Senate regarding the
Internet and the digital world in general.' 21 Senator Hatch further
noted that "the copyright industries contribute[d] more to the U.S.
economy and employ[ed] more workers than any single
manufacturing sector .... Yet, American companies [were] losing $18
to $20 billion annually due to the international piracy of copyrighted
works.1 22 These statements show that the DMCA is meant to deter
this widespread piracy of American ingenuity.123
The DeCSS cases clearly indicate the potential economic harm of
such piracy. Moreover, these cases forced both state and federal
courts to interpret intellectual property laws not only with respect to
remedying alleged economic losses but also with regard to the impact
of such laws on free speech, fair use and reverse engineering. 124 The
next part of this Comment describes these concepts.
3. Limitations on Intellectual Property Rights: The First Amendment,
Fair Use and Reverse Engineering
Intellectual property rights are not without limits. 25  For laws
grounded in the Constitution, such as copyrights and patents, these
119. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1). The DMCA also provides that it does not affect the
right to free speech. Id. § 1201(c)(4) ("Nothing in this section shall enlarge or
diminish any rights of free speech or the press for activities using consumer
electronics, telecommunications, or computing products.").
120. Leahy Statement, supra note 105.
121. Statement of Senator Orrin G. Hatch, available at 1998 WL 11518183
[hereinafter Hatch Statement]. Senator Hatch (R-UT) was first elected to the Senate
in 1976 and is now the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. See Orrin Grant
Hatch, Biographical Summary, at http://hatch.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=
Biography.home (last visited Apr. 2, 2003); see also Lessig, supra note 1, at 262
(providing brief biographical sketch of Senator Hatch and explaining the senator's
views on certain copyright issues).
122. Hatch Statement, supra note 121. These other manufacturing sectors included
"chemicals, industrial equipment, electronics, food processing, textiles and apparel,
and aircraft." Id. But see Lessig, supra note 1, at 201 (describing the income of
copyright owners as a "puny part of the American economy").
123. See Nimmer, supra note 107, at 916.
124. All of the cases interpreting the DMCA in the United States Code Annotated
for the DMCA are related to the movie studios' suit against Corley and others. See 17
U.S.C.A. § 1201 (West Supp. 2002).
125. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to grant authors and
inventors exclusive rights for "limited Times"); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (noting that copyright privileges
are not "unlimited"); Lemley & Volokh, supra note 55, at 229 (stating that trade
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limits are mandated by the Constitution. 26  Other laws, like
California's trade secret act, contain exemptions for reverse
engineering and independent creation. 127  And of course, no
intellectual property law can offend the right to free speech
guaranteed by the First Amendment. 21
a. The First Amendment Right to Free Speech
The First Amendment of the Constitution establishes the right to
free speech. 29 This right, however, is not absolute. 3" The Supreme
Court provided a vivid example of the limits on free speech in
Schenck v. United States 3' when it said that the First Amendment
would not protect someone who falsely yelled "fire" and caused a
panic.3 2  Accordingly, the government may, under certain
circumstances, place limits on citizens' free speech rights. One such
limitation on free speech is the use of prior restraints.'33
The landmark case'34 in the area of prior restraints on free speech is
secret misappropriation covers a limited range of activities); Samuel K. Murumba,
Globalizing Intellectual Property: Linkage and the Challenge of a Justice-Constituency,
19 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 435, 458 (1998) (arguing that intellectual property law must
balance "the public's rights of access.., and the intellectual property owner's
incentive and reward for giving society something of value"); supra notes 82, 88 and
accompanying text.
126. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
127. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
128. U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom
of speech."). The First Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1 ("No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.").
129. U.S. Const. amend. I.
130. See John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 16.7, at 994
(5th ed. 1995) (noting that the Supreme Court has never held that the right to free
speech is absolute); see also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1961)
(stating that the view of First Amendment rights as absolute "cannot be reconciled
with the law relating to libel, slander, misrepresentation, obscenity, perjury, false
advertising, solicitation of crime, complicity by encouragement, conspiracy, and the
like").
131. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
132. Id. at 52. Later, in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), Justice Brandeis
wrote in his concurring opinion that while free speech is a fundamental right that may
not be abridged, it is "not in [its] nature absolute. [Its] exercise is subject to
restriction, if the particular restriction proposed is required in order to protect the
State from destruction or from serious injury, political, economic or moral." Id. at 373
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
133. See Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 130, § 16.16, at 1.020 (noting that "prior
restraint is still considered a more serious restriction on free speech than subsequent
punishment" and that "[f]reedom of speech and of the press 'has meant, principally
although not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship"' (citations
omitted)).
134. Joel M. Gora, The Pentagon Papers Case and The Path Not Taken: A Personal
Memoir on the First Amendment and the Separation of Powers, 19 Cardozo L. Rev.
1311, 1328 (1998); see also T. Barton Carter et al., The First Amendment and the
Fourth Estate 340 (7th ed. 1997) (describing New York Times as "[o]ne of the most
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New York Times Co. v. United States, 135 which addressed the
publication by the New York Times and the Washington Post of the
"Pentagon Papers.' 36 The Supreme Court held that "[a]ny system of
prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity."'37  Thus, "showing
justification for ... such a restraint"'38 is "a heavy burden.' 39 It is
disputed, however, whether a preliminary injunction granted pursuant
to a claim of copyright infringement is a prior restraint similar to that
in the Pentagon Papers case; such injunctions in trade secret cases are
not generally seen as improper prior restraints on speech. 40
The dispute over preliminary injunctions in intellectual property
cases reflects the importance of the First Amendment. Though the
First Amendment is widely considered one of the most critical of
Americans' constitutional rights,'4' its limits are just as widely
acknowledged.'42 In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,43 a 1942 case
relied on by the California Court of Appeal in Bunner,'" the Supreme
Court held that there are certain kinds of speech that are not entitled
to First Amendment protection because "such utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
dramatic confrontations between the federal government and the press").
135. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
136. After "a massive leak of secret government documents," the New York Times
and the Washington Post both published excerpts of the Pentagon Papers in June
1971. Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 130, § 16.17, at 1025. The U.S. Attorney
General sought restraining orders prohibiting both newspapers from printing the
Pentagon Papers. The Court granted certiorari on an expedited basis, and its opinion
was issued seventeen days after the first publication of the Pentagon Papers by the
New York Times. In a short per curiam opinion, the Court agreed that the District
Courts in each case had correctly held that the government did not prove that a
restraint on the newspapers was justified. Id. The Pentagon Papers were officially
entitled "History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Vietnam Policy." Gora, supra
note 134, at 1311.
137. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372
U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
138. Id. (quoting Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).
139. Id.
140. See Shiver, supra note 66, at 362. For an example of a case holding that a
preliminary injunction for copyright infringement is not a prior restraint in violation
of the First Amendment, see Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109
F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
141. Ashcroft v. A.C.L.U., 122 S. Ct. 1700, 1707 (2002) (stating that the First
Amendment "embodies '[o]ur profound national commitment to the free exchange of
ideas"' (quoting Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657,
686 (1989)).
142. Id.; see also Carter et al., supra note 134, at 50 (noting that "speech generally is
a protected activity" and that "the Supreme Court has long placed certain categories
of words outside the First Amendment's protection"); supra notes 130, 132 and
accompanying text.
143. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
144. DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338, 348-49, review
granted, 41 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2002).
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them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.1' 45  Since Chaplinsky, speech has been validly limited by
courts in a variety of contexts, including obscenity, 146 lies, 47
defamation 4 and advertising. 49 In addition, the First Amendment
may not protect speech in the form of instructions if those instructions
describe how to do something illegal. 5"
145. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
146. Obscenity is a form of speech that the Chaplinsky Court considered beyond
the pale of the First Amendment. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72. Public morality
plays a role in determining whether particular speech is obscene. See, e.g., Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (holding that obscenity is determined through
the application of "contemporary community standards").
147. Promoting the "exposition of ideas" and "the social interest in order and
morality," Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572, outweighs the right to free speech with respect
to "calculated falsehoods." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (stating that
"[c]alculated falsehood falls into that class of utterances [whose benefit] ... 'is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality' (quoting Chaplinsky, 315
U.S. at 572)). Such falsehoods have been called "knowing lie[s]-knowing something
is false and saying it anyway." Carter et al., supra note 134, at 51. "Knowing lies"
include perjury and fraud. Id.
148. A justification for penalizing defamation-a kind of falsehood-is the harm
such speech can do to a person's reputation. See Journal-Gazette Co. v. Bandido's
Inc., 712 N.E.2d 446, 451 (1999) (stating that "because society has a strong interest in
protecting attacks upon individual reputation, the law of defamation was created").
However, for a "public figure" plaintiff to prevail in such suits, the plaintiff must show
that the defendant acted with actual malice. See id.; see also New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Actual malice was defined in Sullivan as saying
something "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not." Id. at 280. Free speech may also be limited by an individual's right
to privacy. Carter et al., supra note 134, at 187 (observing that "the right of freedom
of expression [is balanced] against the right of individuals to be let alone"). These
examples show that the right to speak about a person is limited by concerns for that
person's interests.
149. When first faced with the issue in 1942, the Supreme Court held that
commercial speech was not protected by the First Amendment. Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). However, in 1976 the Court decided that
advertisements were entitled to First Amendment protection. Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). Then, in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557
(1980), the Court held that restrictions on commercial speech like advertisements
must pass a balancing test based on a four-part analysis. Id. at 566. The Court defined
commercial speech as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience." Id. at 561 (citations omitted). The Court said, "[t]he
Constitution ... accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other
constitutionally guaranteed expression. The protection available for particular
commercial expression turns on the nature of both the expression and of the
governmental interests served by its regulation." Id. at 562-63 (citations omitted).
150. In United States v. Raymond, 228 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2000), the Seventh Circuit
held that the First Amendment does not protect the publication of instructions for
violating tax laws. Id. at 815. Similarly, in United States v. Featherston, 461 F.2d 1119
(5th Cir. 1972), the Fifth Circuit held that the First Amendment does not protect
instructions for building an explosive device. Id. at 1122-23. However, in Herceg v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987), the same circuit held that the
First Amendment does protect instructions for engaging in a dangerous (but not
illegal) sex act. Id. at 1020-25. Computer programs are considered instructions to a
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These examples show the scope of First Amendment protections,
and that the right to free speech may be counter-balanced by other
interests. 15 Furthermore, the examples demonstrate that, in analyzing
the First Amendment, courts can and should consider the purpose of a
restriction on the right to free speech, as well as the purpose of the
speech itself.
One way courts balance free speech rights against other concerns is
by treating "content-based" and "content-neutral" laws differently.'52
Before looking at a law to determine whether it is content-based or
content-neutral, however, the court must first decide if the
communication or activity at issue is sufficiently expressive to fall
under the umbrella of the First Amendment. 53  Often, a law will
affect activity that has both speech (protectable) and non-speech
(unprotectable) elements. 154 Once such a speech component is found
in the activity, the court can then address the validity of the
challenged regulation. That inquiry begins with asking whether the
law is content-based or content-neutral. 155
According to the Supreme Court's ruling in Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 156 a restriction on speech is content-neutral if it "serves
purposes unrelated to the content of expression.., even if [the
regulation] has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but
not others.' 1 57  In other words, said the Court, "regulation of
expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is 'justified without
computer. See supra note 39; see also infra note 259 and accompanying text.
151. See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 49, at 21 (noting that "a balance must be
struck between protecting private property and free speech rights when both interests
are simultaneously involved" (citing Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F.
Supp. 2d 211, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), and Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v.
Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1979))). In Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, the Fifth Circuit said that "[t]he first amendment is not a license to
trammel on legally recognized rights in intellectual property." 600 F.2d at 1188; see
also Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 49, at 22 (claiming that "[slituations always exist,
where a particular right, no matter how important, must give way to a competing
concern" and that "[i]n fact, almost all legal rules represent a balance of several
competing underlying policies" (footnotes omitted)); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with
Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 Yale L.J. 1717, 1729 (1999)
("To agree to treat a class of stuff as intellectual property, we normally require a
showing that, if protection is not extended, bad things will happen that will outweigh
the resulting good things.").
152. See Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 130, § 16.47, at 1142-43.
153. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1974).
154. The Supreme Court has faced challenges to laws affecting both speech and
non-speech acts in cases such as Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)
(regulation of the volume of amplified music); Spence, 418 U.S. 405 (restriction on the
display of the American flag); and United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)
(prosecution of person who burned his draft card).
155. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 789-94; see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719-22
(2000); Spence, 418 U.S. at 409-10; O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77; Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d at 429, 450-51 (2d Cir. 2001).
156. 491 U.S. 781.
157. Id. at 791.
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reference to the content of the regulated speech.""5  Conversely,
regulations adopted "because of disagreement with [a] message" are
content-based.'59  According to the Court, "[t]he government's
purpose is the controlling consideration" in categorizing a law as
content-based or content-neutral.
6 0
The level of scrutiny applied to a particular law depends on whether
it is content-neutral or content-based. According to the tests
established by the Supreme Court, courts must scrutinize content-
based restrictions more closely than content-neutral restrictions.
While content-based laws have been called "presumptively invalid"'
61
by the Supreme Court, in Sable Communications of California, Inc. v.
FCC 162 the Supreme Court described the conditions under which
content-based laws are valid. According to the Court, content-based
restrictions are permissible only if they serve compelling interests
using the least restrictive means to further those interests.'63 In Ward,
the Court held that content-neutral restrictions are constitutional as
long as they are "narrowly tailored to serve the government's
legitimate, content-neutral interests but... [the restriction] need not
be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so. '' "4 Thus,
158. Id.
159. Id. Distinguishing disagreement with a message from disagreement with
conduct may be difficult when the two activities seem inseparable. The Supreme
Court's opinions in Spence, 418 U.S. 405, and O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, provide guidance
in making the distinction. Both Spence and O'Brien were prosecuted in connection
with their war protests. Spence, 418 U.S. at 406-08; O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369-70. Both
men wanted to convey the same message-their opposition to war-but each man
used different conduct to convey that message. Spence hung his American flag
outside his window with a peace symbol affixed to it. Spence, 418 U.S. at 405. O'Brien
burned his draft card in front of a large crowd. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369. The
Supreme Court held in Spence that "prosecution for the expression of an idea through
activity" violated the First Amendment. Spence, 418 U.S. at 411. The Court found the
state's claimed interests in keeping the peace, protecting the "sensibilities of
passersby," id. at 412, and respecting and preserving the meaning of the flag, were
unpersuasive in justifying Spence's prosecution. Id. at 411-15. In contrast, the
O'Brien Court found that the government's interests in maintaining the selective
service system were both substantial and unrelated to the communicative aspects of
burning a selective service registration; therefore, the prohibition against destroying
draft cards was constitutional. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 378-82.
160. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
161. R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
162. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
163. Id. at 126.
164. Ward, 491 U.S. at 798. The Corley court, drawing on Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994), a case which relied on Ward, id. at 642,
stated the test as follows:
A content-neutral restriction is permissible if it serves a substantial
governmental interest, the interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression, and the regulation is narrowly tailored, "which in this context
requires.., that the means chosen do not 'burden substantially more speech
than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests."'
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 450 (2d Cir. 2001) (citations
omitted).
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content-based restrictions must be able to withstand strict scrutiny to
be upheld, while content-neutral restrictions are subject to a less
exacting level of analysis.
The above discussion describes some of the balancing tests that
courts must use in evaluating the validity of laws in the face of First
Amendment challenges. Similarly, the fair use provisions of the
Copyright Act'65 provide courts with guidelines to weigh the exclusive
rights granted to copyright owners against the right to free speech.
1 66
b. Fair Use
As previously noted, fair use existed long before it was made law in
1976.167 The kind of activities courts deemed fair uses traditionally
centered on commentary, criticism, scholarship, research, and news
reporting. 68 The House Report explained that while the fair use
defense was commonly invoked, at the time, there was still "no real
definition" of fair use. 169  Due to the doctrine's equitable nature,
however, the House explicitly recognized the need for it to be applied
on a case by case basis. 17° Despite the amorphous nature of fair use
before Section 107 was enacted, courts did develop certain guidelines
for weighing the opposing interests of free speech and copyright
against each other.' 7' The House Report stated that Section 107
resulted "from the long controversy over the related problems of fair
use and the reproduction (mostly by photocopying) of copyrighted
material for educational and scholarly purposes.' '7
While the legislative history of Section 107 refers to fair use as a
defense,73 there is a difference of opinion as to whether fair use is a
defense or a right. 174 The distinction is important because if there is a
165. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
166. See supra note 91 and accompanying text; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S.
Ct. 769, 788 (2003) (stating that "copyright's limited monopolies are compatible with
free speech principles"); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 558 (1985) ("[T]he Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free
expression.").
167. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. According to the House Report,
"[t]he claim that a defendant's acts constituted a fair use rather than an infringement
ha[d] been raised as a defense in innumerable copyright actions over the years, and
there is ample case law recognizing the existence of the doctrine and applying it."
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678.
168. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 65, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659 at 5678-79.
169. Id., reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659 at 5679.
170. Id., reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659 at 5679 (noting that since fair use "is
an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each
case raising the question must be decided on its own facts").
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., supra notes 167,169 and accompanying text.
174. Nat'l Research Council, supra note 1, at 5; see also supra note 96 and
accompanying text.
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right to fair use, just as there is a right to free speech, then it is
"acceptable to take positive actions" to exercise that right. 75
However, if fair use is a defense, taking such "positive actions" may
turn out to be illegal if the action is challenged as one of copyright
infringement.'76
In any case, it is generally accepted that fair use needs to evolve as
new technologies develop.'77 In 1976, Congress was concerned about
the threats posed by photocopying. 7" Today, courts are concerned
with perfect digital reproduction and immediate worldwide
distribution of copyrighted works. 179
The legislative history of Section 107 specifically mentioned new
technologies: "[T]here is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the
statute, especially during a period of rapid technological change."'' "
From this statement, it is evident that Congress intended fair use to be
adapted to new technologies as they developed.""
Soon after the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976, courts began
to determine how to apply copyright law to computer programs."'2 In
connection with some of these decisions, courts considered whether
reverse engineering was a fair use. A case providing guidance"'3 on
this issue is the Ninth Circuit's decision in Sega Enterprises Ltd. v.
Accolade, Inc."'4 There, the court held that reverse engineering a
copyrighted computer game in order to access unprotected ideas and
functional elements embodied in the game, combined with a
175. Nat'l Research Council, supra note 1, at 5.
176. Id. The National Research Council uses an example drawing on the anti-
circumvention provisions of the DMCA:
If fair use is an affirmative right, for instance, then it ought to be acceptable
to take positive actions, such as circumventing content protection
mechanisms (e.g., decoding an encrypted file), in order to exercise fair use.
But taking such positive actions may well be illegal under the regime of fair
use as a defense. The basic point is very controversial; some legal
scholars ... have labeled as "absurd" the notion that fair use could be an
affirmative right.
Id.
177. See infra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
179. For example, the Second Circuit noted that Congress enacted the DMCA
because it was "If]earful that the ease with which pirates could copy and distribute a
copyrightable work in digital form was overwhelming the capacity of conventional
copyright enforcement." Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 435 (2d
Cir. 2001).
180. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5680.
181. See, e.g., Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(noting that the Copyright Act of 1976 "was plainly crafted with the goal of media
neutrality in mind" and that "[kley terms of the Act are defined to accommodate
developing technologies"), rev'd on other grounds, 206 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2000), affd
533 U.S. 483 (2000).
182. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
183. Joyce et al., supra note 77, at 173.
184. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
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legitimate reason for seeking such access, was fair use of the game.
The court reasoned that deeming the reverse engineering of a
computer program illegal would have given Sega, a video game and
console manufacturer, a "de facto monopoly," for which a patent
would be required."6
The DMCA does not include a section dedicated to fair use
comparable to Section 107 of the Copyright Act.'87 This fact has led
to much criticism of the DMCA's reach.'88 Often overlooked in the
criticism, however, are Sections 1201(c) and (f) of the DMCA, which
provide that the DMCA does not affect certain defenses to an
allegation of infringement.'89 In addition to specifically mentioning
fair use,19° the DMCA explicitly permits reverse engineering.19" ' With
respect to fair use, the DMCA provides that "[niothing in this section
shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright
infringement, including fair use, under this title.1 92 As for reverse
engineering, Section 1201(f)(1) of the Act allows anyone "who has
lawfully obtained the right to use a. .'. computer program" '93 to
reverse engineer that program to make it work with other programs.'94
These and other exceptions'95 embody the same principles as the
185. See id. at 1517-18. The court did note, however, that its ruling did not
preclude a possible finding of copyright infringement of plaintiff's work by the
defendant's competing work. Id. at 1528; see also Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of
Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that reverse engineering of a
computer program to find the unprotectable ideas in the program is a fair use);
Lessig, supra note 1, at 185 (stating that "[rieverse engineering is ordinarily a
permissible 'fair use' under copyright law" (citing Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v.
Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000))). Reverse engineering is discussed in
further detail below. See infra Part I.B.3.c.
186. Sega Enters. Ltd., 977 F.2d at 1526.
187. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) ("The fair use of a copyrighted work ... is not an
infringement of copyright.").
188. See supra note 118 and accompanying text; see also Lessig, supra note 1, at
187-88; Nat'l Research Council, supra note 1, at 14 (stating that the "useful practice"
of "experimental circumvention" is "threatened by ... the DMCA").
189. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c), (f); see also supra notes 113,119 and accompanying text.
190. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1).
191. Id. § 1201(f)(1); see also supra note 113 and accompanying text; infra note 199
and accompanying text.
192. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1).
193. Id. § 1201(f)(1).
194. Id. The relevant clause states:
[A] person who has lawfully obtained the right to use a copy of a computer
program may circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a particular portion of that program for the sole purpose of
identifying and analyzing those elements of the program that are necessary
to achieve interoperability of an independently created computer program
with other programs, and that have not previously been readily available to
the person engaging in the circumvention, to the extent any such acts of
identification and analysis do not constitute infringement under this title.
Id.; see also supra notes 113,119 and accompanying text.
,195. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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fair use doctrine codified in Section 107 of the Copyright Act.'96 The
next section describes the practice of reverse engineering and how it is
treated by various intellectual property laws, including the DMCA
and UTSA.
c. Reverse Engineering
Reverse engineering has been defined as "starting with the known
product and working backward to divine the process which aided in its
development or manufacture.' 19 7 While reverse engineering is often
associated with new technologies, the technique is not unique to them.
Reverse engineering has long been used to discover what makes
products "tick."' 98 In spite of the traditional acceptance of reverse
engineering as a legitimate means of creating competitive products,'99
the process has been the subject of much attention and debate
recently."z " This attention and debate is due in part to the rapid pace
of technological developments within the United States and abroad.
In more traditional manufacturing industries, reverse engineering was
often time-consuming, expensive and challenging.2 t Today, however,
experienced reverse engineers are able to discover the "secrets" of
highly proprietary products such as software, computer chips, and
other digital products more efficiently."" The traditional
196. See supra notes 91-92, 168 and accompanying text. The DMCA exceptions
require the researcher to act in good faith and have the purpose of advancing
knowledge. See 17 U.S.C §§ 1201(g), 1201(j); see also supra note 113. This
requirement is comparable to Section 107's consideration of whether a use was for
commercial purposes. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. Thus, the DMCA
also comports with the Constitution's goal of "promot[ing] the Progress of Science
and useful Arts." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
197. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,476 (1974); see also Samuelson
& Scotchmer, supra note 51, at 1577 (defining reverse engineering as "the process of
extracting know-how or knowledge from a human-made artifact").
198. Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 51, at 1577 ("Reverse engineering has a
long history as an accepted practice.").
199. Id. This acceptance may be seen in the UTSA and DMCA as both laws
include specific exemptions for reverse engineering. The UTSA provides that reverse
engineering, in and of itself, is not a misappropriation under the Act. Cal. Civ. Code §
3426.1(a) (West 1997); see also supra note 57 and accompanying text. The DMCA
states that circumvention of a technological measure is permissible only "to achieve
interoperability" between hardware and/or software. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(1); see also
supra notes 113, 189, 191 and accompanying text. The issue in Corley, then, is what
the defendant did beyond achieving interoperability (i.e., dissemination of DeCSS
over the Internet). See Sableman, supra note 213, at 1327.
200. Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 51, at 1577 (stating that "reverse
engineering has been under siege in the past few decades").
201. See id. at 1579.
202. See id. at 1580. According to Samuelson and Scotchmer, with respect to
digital products,
the relevant knowledge [required for reverse engineering] is entirely on the
surface of the product, at least in the absence of technical protections such as
encryption .... [A] difficult analytical process is required to ascertain
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manufacturing industries could accept reverse engineering as a valid
way to create new, competing, and often more innovative products,
because by the time second-comers arrived on the market, the first-
comers would have had ample opportunity to recoup their research
and development costs. 20 3  More efficient reverse engineering
technologies have made first-comers vulnerable to second-comers
taking away the first-comers' market share and profit.0 4
When faced with such a threat in the past, industries encouraged
legislative action to protect their investments (financial and
otherwise) in new product development. Creators of digital content
saw this threat to their intellectual property, and Congress responded
with the DMCA. °6
With the DMCA in place, intellectual property owners had another
statutory tool to safeguard their valuable rights.0 7 In the case against
Corley, the movie studios relied on the DMCA to guard digital
content from piracy."' 8 The DVDCCA, in contrast, looked to
California's trade secret law to protect its proprietary information.0 9
With the history of trade secrets, copyright law, and their limitations
in mind, this Comment now analyzes DVDCCA v. Bunner and the
Universal cases.
II. THE BUNNER AND CORLEY COURTS' DISAGREEMENT OVER THE
FIRST AMENDMENT'S IMPACT ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF DECSS
The movie studios and the DVDCCA were initially successful in
their claims against Corley and Bunner, respectively.210 Corley and
Bunner both appealed the decisions against them. The Second Circuit
information embedded in the program, but it is there for the taking if a
reverse engineer is willing to spend the time to study it.
Id. at 1579-80; see also Lessig, supra note 1, at 7 (describing the decreasing costs of
distribution and production and falling "barriers to creativity... [that] are the
consequences of going digital").
203. See Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 51, at 1579-80. Samuelson and
Scotchmer perceive lead time as a "short-lived intellectual property right." Id. at 1586;
see also Lessig, supra note 1, at 71 (arguing that "real capitalists invest and innovate
with the understanding that competitors will be free to take their ideas and use them
against the innovators").
204. See Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 51, at 1578-88.
205. See id. at 1580-81; see also supra note 51 and accompanying text.
206. See Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 51, at 1580-81 (stating that "copyright
industry groups persuaded Congress to enact the [DMCA], which creates new legal
rules reinforcing technical measures used by copyright owners to protect their
works"); see also supra notes 100, 103 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 104, 107 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 11, 12, 15, 16 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 13, 17 and accompanying text.
210. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), affd sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir.
2001); DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338, 340, review
granted, 41 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2002).
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affirmed the ruling for the movie studios in the case against Corley. 211
Bunner, on the other hand, prevailed in his appeal when the
California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's decision.212 The
decisions in these cases left intellectual property owners and hackers
alike wondering what their rights are.21 3 This part reviews the
decisions in each appeal.
A. Application of Trade Secrets Law (UTSA) in Bunner 21 1
The DVD Copy Control Association ("DVDCCA") is a movie
industry trade association that controls the rights to the encryption
program known as CSS, and licenses CSS to DVD player
manufacturers. 25 DVDCCA alleged in its complaint against Bunner
that DeCSS, which decrypts CSS, 216 was illegally derived by "hacking
and/or improperly reverse engineering" CSS, and that CSS was the
DVDCCA's "proprietary confidential information. '217  The
DVDCCA tried to protect the secrecy of CSS through its license
agreements with the manufacturers of DVD players.2 s CSS was only
disclosed to those manufacturers who signed the DVDCCA's license
agreements; the agreements imposed confidentiality obligations on
211. Corley, 273 F.3d 429.
212. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338. For another example of a decision deeming a
state trade secret law content-based, see Sports Management News, Inc. v. Nachtigal,
921 P.2d 1304 (Or. 1996). This Comment disagrees with the rationale underlying the
Sports Management News decision for the reasons discussed infra Part III.B.1.
213. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also Mark Sableman, Link Law
Revisited: Internet Linking Law at Five Years, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1273, 1324-26
(2001).
214. There is no published trial court opinion in the case against Bunner, so the
facts and prior history are taken from the appellate decision.
215. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 341; see also supra notes 35-37 and accompanying
text.
216. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
217. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 341 (internal quotation marks omitted). The first
prong in the analysis for determining whether the UTSA was violated is establishing
that the information at issue is a trade secret. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying
text. The reverse engineering was improper because that act was prohibited by the
end-user license agreement ("EULA") that all purchasers of a CSS-enabled DVD
player must consent to. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 342. The California Court of
Appeal found that "the user's assent to the agreement was obtained only through the
installment process and was therefore a 'click wrap' license agreement." Id. The court
did not define "click wrap" license. One federal district court has defined such a
license as a software license which is presented to the end-user as "a message on his
or her computer screen, requiring that the user manifest his or her assent to the terms
of the license agreement by clicking on an icon. The [software] cannot be obtained or
used unless and until the icon is clicked." Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.,
150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 593-94 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (footnote omitted). Regarding the
questionable force of EULAs, see Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 51, at 1626-30.
For an example of a case enforcing a shrink-wrap license, see ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
218. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 341; see also supra note 35 and accompanying
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the manufacturers.219
The DVDCCA sought a preliminary injunction against Bunner and
other web site operators barring them from making any future
disclosures of DeCSS. 22° After a hearing, the trial court granted the
injunction. 221 That order enjoined Bunner and the other defendants
from "posting or otherwise disclosing or distributing [DeCSS] ... or
any other information derived from" CSS. 222  The trial court
"expressly refused to enjoin the defendants from linking to other web
sites that contained protected information,"223 and went on to state
that "nothing in this Order shall prohibit discussion, comment or
criticism, so long as the [DVDCCA's] proprietary information ... is
not disclosed or distributed. 224
In support of its decision, the trial court found that the DVDCCA
met the statutory requirements for UTSA protection because the
DVDCCA established that CSS was its trade secret and it used
reasonable efforts to protect CSS from being disclosed. The trial
court found that "the circumstantial evidence, available mostly due to
the various defendants' inclination to boast about their disrespect for
the law, is quite compelling on... the issue of... the [d]efendants'
knowledge of impropriety." '226 Furthermore, the trial court found that
the balance of hardships weighed in the DVDCCA's favor.227
Bunner appealed from the lower court's decision, claiming that his
publication of DeCSS was an exercise of free speech protected by the
First Amendment.22' The DVDCCA responded that Bunner "had no
First Amendment right to disclose a trade secret in violation of the
UTSA. '229  The court first considered whether computer code is
speech230 and then addressed the scope of First Amendment
protection, if any, available to DeCSS. 3
The DVDCCA argued that "DeCSS is insufficiently expressive [to
merit First Amendment protection] because it is composed of source
219. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 341; see also supra note 36 and accompanying
text.
220. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 341. The DVDCCA also sought a temporary
restraining order. Id. at 342.
221. Id. at 344.
222. Id.
223. Id. This is in contrast to the Universal decisions. See infra note 281 and
accompanying text.
224. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 344.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 345.
228. Id. at 340.
229. Id. at 347.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 348. The Universal courts performed a similar analysis. See infra Part
II.B.2.
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code and has a functional aspect." 232 However, the Bunner court drew
a distinction between source code and object code. 33 The court held
that while object code is not expressive, source code is expressive.3
The court next considered whether the injunction, as a restriction
on speech, violated Bunner's First Amendment rights. Both parties
recognized that First Amendment rights are not absolute.235 Despite
this acknowledgment, the court found that "DeCSS does not fall into
any.., established exceptions [to the First Amendment]: it is not
lewd, profane, obscene, or libelous, nor did it involve any fighting
words.... Although the social value of DeCSS may be questionable, it
is nonetheless pure speech. 236 Evidently, the court did not consider
other factors which may affect the scope of First Amendment
protection, including whether the UTSA is content-based or content-
neutral.237
Because the appellate court determined that Bunner's activities
were "pure speech," it applied independent review to the trial court's
order. 3 8 The court noted that prior restraints on such speech are
presumed to be unconstitutional. 239  The court also found that the
UTSA was overbroad.240 Comparing the UTSA to federal copyright
law, the court noted that UTSA protection was infinite rather than
232. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 347. The plaintiff movie studios in the Universal
cases made similar claims. See infra note 267 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 39.
234. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348. The court reached this conclusion despite
the fact that source code can be "compiled" into inexpressive object code. See supra
note 39 and accompanying text. The Bunner court held:
DeCSS is a written expression of the author's ideas and information about
decryption of DVDs without CSS. If the source code were "compiled" to
create object code, we would agree that the resulting composition of zeroes
and ones would not convey ideas. That the source code is capable of such
compilation, however, does not destroy the expressive nature of the source
code itself. Thus, we conclude that the trial court's preliminary injunction
barring Bunner from disclosing DeCSS can fairly be characterized as a
prohibition on "pure" speech.
Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348 (internal citations omitted). Whether Bunner's
activity can accurately be deemed "pure speech" is open to debate. See Sableman,
supra note 213, at 1327.
235. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
484-85 (1957)).
236. Id. at 349 (emphasis added).
237. See supra Part I.B.3.A.
238. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 346, 349.
239. Id. at 351 (citing Hurvitz v. Hoefflin, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 558, 565 (Ct. App.
2000)). But see Shiver, supra note 66, at 362 (maintaining that preliminary injunctions
granted pursuant to a trade secret misappropriation claim are not viewed as prior
restraints); see also supra note 133.
240. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 350 ("The UTSA prohibits even speech that is
scholarly, addresses legitimate concerns, and seeks no profit for the speaker."). This
was despite the fact that the UTSA specifically permits reverse engineering. See supra
notes 57, 199 and accompanying text.
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"for limited times. '241' Therefore, the court concluded that the reasons
for granting injunctive relief in copyright infringement cases are
inapplicable to trade secrets. 242 The court concluded: "Our respect for
the Legislature and its enactment of the UTSA cannot displace our
duty to safeguard the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.
Accordingly, we are compelled to reverse the preliminary
injunction. 243
The court did provide some cautionary notes, stating that it was not
deciding whether a permanent injunction could be granted after a full
trial.244 Moreover, the court concluded its opinion by noting that
"anyone who infringes a copyright held by DVDCCA or by any DVD
content provider may be subject to an action under the Copyright Act.
We hold only that a preliminary injunction cannot be used to restrict
Bunner from disclosing DeCSS. ' 245 The truth of this final word of
caution is shown by the movie studios' action against Eric Corley.
B. Application of Copyright Law (DMCA) in Universal
In the case against Corley,246 the district court issued a permanent
injunction barring Corley from posting DeCSS on the web site for his
magazine, 2600: The Hacker's Quarterly, and from knowingly
including on the site links to other sites offering DeCSS.247 Corley
appealed the district court's decision on both fair use and
constitutional grounds.248
1. The Fair Use Argument
Corley contended that despite the fact that the DMCA explicitly
criminalizes circumvention, Section 1201(c)(1)-which provides that
fair use is a defense to the DMCA249 -should be read to permit
circumvention when the work accessed through that circumvention
"will be put to 'fair uses.' ''250 The court disagreed.2 1' The court held
241. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 349 (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8) (emphasis
added).
242. Id. at 350.
243. Id. at 351.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 351-52. In February 2002, the California Supreme Court granted review
of Bunner. DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 41 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2002). Because of
the grant of review, the Bunner appellate decision is unpublished. See Cal. Ct. R. 976,
977.
246. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
247. Id. at 434-35. Both Corley and his magazine were defendants in the case. Id.
at 439. For this reason, the court sometimes referred only to Corley, and at other
times referred to the "defendants." See, e.g., id. at 441.
248. Id. at 436.
249. See supra notes 117-19, 187-92, 195-96 and accompanying text.
250. Corley, 273 F.3d at 443.
251. Id.
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that the provision "ensures that the DMCA is not read to prohibit the
'fair use' of information just because that information was obtained in
a manner made illegal by the DMCA. ' '252  That is, using the
information may be permissible; getting the information through
circumvention is not.
2. The Constitutional Claims
In evaluating Corley's First Amendment claims, the court continued
its "'evolutionary' approach to the task of tailoring familiar
constitutional rules to novel technological circumstances, favoring
'narrow' holdings that would permit the law to mature on a 'case-by-
case' basis., 253 In its analysis of the constitutional claims, the court
considered "whether computer code is speech, whether computer
programs are speech, the scope of First Amendment protection for
computer code, and the scope of First Amendment protection for
decryption code. 254
a. Computer Code Is Speech
The Second Circuit had little trouble affirming the district court's
conclusion that computer code is speech. It drew an analogy between
computer code expressed in ones and zeroes and mathematical
formulae and musical scores.255 All three forms of communication are
written in "symbolic notations not comprehensible to the
uninitiated, ' 256 but this fact alone does not make them ineligible for
First Amendment protection.257
b. Computer Programs Are Speech
Computer code, however, is not the same thing as a computer
program. Code is the language in which programs are written. That
is, just as a novel is written in a particular language, a computer
program is written in computer code.258 Because programs are
instructions having functional utility,259 whether they are protected by
the First Amendment depends on "the scope of the Constitution's
252. Id. The court said that Corley's reading of 1201(c)(1) was "not only outside
the range of plausible readings of the provision, but ... [was] also clearly refuted by
the statute's legislative history." Id.
253. Id. at 445 (citing Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573,
584 n.l (2d Cir. 2000), in which the court began this approach).
254. Id. at 445. The California Court of Appeal used a similar analysis in Bunner.
See supra Part II.A.
255. Corley, 273 F.3d at 445-46; see also supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
256. Corley, 273 F.3d at 445.
257. Id. at 445-46.
258. Id. at 446; see also supra note 39.
259. Corley, 273 F.3d at 446; see also supra note 39.
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protection of speech" in general.26
While some commentators argue that only political speech should
be afforded First Amendment protection,261 "the law has not been so
limited. '262 Thus, courts have applied First Amendment scrutiny to a
wide variety of speech, including the publication of instructions.263
With respect to such publications, however, applying the First
Amendment does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the
instructions will receive First Amendment protection because
"instructions are of varied types. '264  Basically, instructions which
explain how to violate laws do not merit First Amendment protection,
while other instructions-even if they describe dangerous acts-are
protected.265 The reason for this distinction is not that instructions as
such are incapable of First Amendment protection, but that the First
Amendment does not protect speech with the sole purpose of
facilitating illegal actions.266
The Second Circuit disregarded the argument that computer
programs are not true speech merely because they require the use of a
computer to be communicated .2  Thus, both computer code and
computer programs "can merit First Amendment protection. '26" The
inquiry did not end there, however, because the court also considered
the effect that DeCSS's non-speech elements have, if any, on the First
Amendment protection applicable to it. 269
The court disagreed with the contention that computer programs
are pure speech.270 Computer code can instantaneously perform tasks
and disseminate the results of those tasks worldwide via the
Internet. 27I A person must intervene for the computer to carry out
these tasks, but "this momentary intercession of human action does
260. Corley, 273 F.3d at 446; see also supra Part I.B.3.a.
261. Corley, 273 F.3d at 446 (citing Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 20 (1971)).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 447; see also supra note 150 and accompanying text.
264. Corley, 273 F.3d at 447 n.17.
265. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
266. Corley, 273 F.3d at 447 n.18.
267. Id. at 447. The court compared new technology with familiar tools: "A recipe
is no less 'speech' because it calls for the use of an oven, and a musical score is no less
'speech' because it specifies performance on an electric guitar." Id. The DVDCCA
made a similar argument. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
268. Corley, 273 F.3d at 449 (citations omitted).
269. Id. at 449-50. Corley "vigorously reject[ed] the idea that computer code can
be regulated according to any different standard than that applicable to pure speech,
i.e., speech that lacks a nonspeech component." Id. at 451. This argument ignores the
fact that computer programs may be both expressive and functional. See supra note
39. It also fails to recognize that many other activities regulated by the government
have elements of speech and non-speech activity. See supra notes 154, 159 and
accompanying text.
270. Corley, 273 F.3d at 451.
271. Id.
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not diminish the nonspeech component of code, nor render code
entirely speech. '272  Therefore, the Second Circuit concluded that
"[tihe functionality of computer code properly affects the scope of its
First Amendment protection. 273
Thus, while the court concluded that DeCSS is a form of speech
requiring First Amendment protection, the court also recognized that
the functionality of DeCSS must play a role in determining the scope
of that protection.274 Having described the speech elements contained
in DeCSS, the court then turned to whether the DMCA is content-
based or content-neutral.
3. The DMCA Is Content-Neutral
As noted above, speech is regulated by content-based and content-
neutral regulations. 275  Recognizing this fact, the Corley court
confirmed the lower court's holding that protection for speech
depends on why the restriction was imposed-that is, whether it was
imposed "because of the content of the speech. ' 26  Therefore, in
order to determine the level of protection available to Corley's speech
(the posting of and linking to DeCSS), the court first had to establish
whether the DMCA is content-based or content-neutral.
The Corley court held that in classifying a regulation as content-
based or content-neutral, "'[t]he government's purpose is the
controlling consideration.' 277  The court believed that this analysis
applies to expression, conduct, or any other activity that combines
speech and non-speech elements. 278
272. Id. ("The only human action required to achieve these results can be as
limited and instantaneous as a single click of a mouse.").
273. Id. at 452. The Corley court relied on the District Court's analysis of
computer code's functionality. According to Judge Kaplan, the copying process is
exponential. He wrote:
[T]he assumption that the chain of causation is too attenuated to justify the
use of functionality to determine the level of scrutiny, at least in this context,
is not [accurate]... [T]he only rational assumption is that once a computer
program capable of bypassing ... an access control system [such as CSS] is
disseminated, it will be used .... Every recipient [of DeCSS] is capable not
only of decrypting and perfectly copying plaintiffs' copyrighted DVDs, but
also of retransmitting perfect copies of DeCSS and thus enabling every
recipient to do the same.
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2000),
affd sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
274. Corley, 273 F.3d at 453. According to the Second Circuit, "the capacity of a
decryption program like DeCSS to accomplish unauthorized -indeed, unlawful-
access to materials in which the Plaintiffs have intellectual property rights must
inform and limit the scope of its First Amendment protection." Id.
275. Id. at 450; see also supra notes 153, 155-64 and accompanying text.
276. Corley, 273 F.3d at 450.
277. Id. (citation omitted).
278. Id. (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 -93 (1989); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); and Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,
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The district court's injunction was granted pursuant to the anti-
trafficking provisions of the DMCA. 279 The injunction barred Corley
from two specific activities: (1) posting DeCSS "or any other
technology for circumventing CSS on any Internet web site"2 0 and (2)
"knowingly linking any Internet web site to any other web site
containing DeCSS.
2
'
The court first addressed whether the DMCA's anti-trafficking
clause is content-based or content-neutral, as "this classification
determines the applicable constitutional standard. ' 28 2 Corley argued
that the DMCA is content-based because "the provisions specifically
target.., techniques for circumventing CSS. '2 3 The Second Circuit
disagreed with this interpretation of the meaning of "content-
based. '284  It is true that the DMCA targets decryption codes like
DeCSS, but because the government, through the DMCA, is only
concerned with what DeCSS does, and not what it says, the law is
content-neutral.
Having found the DMCA to be content-neutral, the Corley court
then decided whether the law was constitutional under the test for
such laws.286 The court employed a three-step analysis in this regard:
(1) Does the DMCA promote a substantial government interest? If
so, (2) is that interest unrelated to limiting the exercise of free speech,
and (3) is the DMCA narrowly tailored to serve that interest?287 All
410-11 (1974)).
279. Id. at 453; see also 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2000).
280. Corley, 273 F.3d at 453.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 453-54; see also supra Part II.B.3.a.
283. Corley, 273 F.3d at 454 (internal quotation marks omitted).
284. Id. The court analyzed the purpose of the DMCA as follows:
The DMCA and the posting prohibition are applied to DeCSS solely
because of its capacity to instruct a computer to decrypt CSS. That
functional capability is not speech within the meaning of the First
Amendment. The Government seeks to "justif[y]"... both the application
of the DMCA and the posting prohibition to [Corley] solely on the basis of
the functional capability of DeCSS to instruct a computer to decrypt CSS,
i.e., "without reference to the content of the regulated speech."
Id. (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 720 (2000)) (emphasis added). As to the
prohibition on linking, the court recognized that just as codes like DeCSS have both
speech and non-speech elements, so too do links from one web site to another (such
links are commonly referred to as "hyperlinks"). Id. at 455. It follows that just as the
regulation on disseminating DeCSS is content-neutral because of the code's
functionality, so is the regulation on posting links to DeCSS, because of the
functionality of the links. Id. at 456 ("[t]he linking prohibition is justified solely by the
functional capability of the hyperlink"). This view of linking stands in contrast to the
trial court's decision against Bunner. See supra Part II.A.
285. Id. at 454; see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)
(laws that seek to stop a particular "message" from being conveyed are content-
based).
286. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
287. Corley, 273 F.3d at 450. The Second Circuit described the standard:
A content-neutral restriction is permissible if it serves a substantial
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three questions must be answered in the affirmative for the law to be
constitutional.288
The Second Circuit found that the government has a substantial
interest in stopping unauthorized access to CSS-encrypted
copyrighted works, an interest which is unrelated to the restraint on
free speech.29 Therefore, the provisions of the DMCA challenged by
Corley met the first two elements of the content-neutral restriction
test. The last question was whether the provisions were narrowly
tailored; that is, whether they burdened more speech than
necessary.29
While it is true that the injunction prevented Corley from sharing
the speech component of DeCSS with others, even Corley could not
suggest "any technique ... that makes a lesser restriction on the
code's speech component."2 9' Moreover, the government is not
obliged to create such a technique because "a content-neutral
regulation need not employ the least restrictive means of
accomplishing the governmental objective. '292  Thus, both the
prohibition against posting DeCSS and that against linking to DeCSS
did not burden more speech than necessary.293
The court commented,
[a]s they have throughout their arguments, the [defendants, Corley
and his magazine,] ignore the reality of the functional capacity of
decryption computer code and hyperlinks to facilitate instantaneous
unauthorized access to copyrighted materials by anyone anywhere in
the world. Under the circumstances amply shown by the record, the
injunction's linking prohibition validly regulates the [defendants']
governmental interest, the interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression, and the regulation is narrowly tailored, which "in this context
requires ... that the means chosen do not 'burden substantially more speech
than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests."'
Id. (citations omitted); see also supra note 164 and accompanying text.
288. Corley, 273 F.3d at 450; see also supra note 164 and accompanying text.
289. Corley, 273 F.3d at 454.
290. Id. at 450; see also supra note 164 and accompanying text.
291. Corley, 273 F.3d at 454 (citation omitted).
292. Id. at 455; see also supra note 164 and accompanying text. Moreover, with
respect to the linking portion of the injunction, the Court of Appeals upheld the test
created by Judge Kaplan in the District Court. Corley, 273 F.3d at 457. Judge
Kaplan's test was based on that in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964). Judge Kaplan's test required:
clear and convincing evidence that those responsible for the link (a) know at
the relevant time that the offending material is on the linked-to site, (b)
know that it is circumvention technology that may not lawfully be offered,
and (c) create or maintain the link for the purpose of disseminating that
technology.
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 341. Sullivan required
evidence of actual malice on the part of the defendant for a public official plaintiff to
recover libel damages. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80; see also supra notes 130, 142-49
and accompanying text.
293. Corley, 273 F.3d at 454.
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opportunity instantly to enable anyone anywhere to gain
unauthorized access to copyrighted movies on DVDs.294
The court felt that it was faced with "two unattractive alternatives:
either tolerate some impairment of communication in order to permit
Congress to prohibit decryption that may lawfully be prevented, or
tolerate some decryption in order to avoid some impairment of
communication. '9 5  In the face of such a challenge, the court was
"mindful" that it is up to Congress to decide such issues.296 Thus, in
upholding the injunction against Corley, the Second Circuit was
fulfilling the legislature's intent to stop trafficking in decryption
technologies.297
The Second Circuit, unlike the California appellate court, also
recognized that the appropriate means for evaluating a First
Amendment defense in an intellectual property case lies in the
content-neutral/content-based dichotomy. Part III will describe how
this analysis could have been applied in Bunner. Part III also
contends that most intellectual property laws are content-neutral.
III. THE UTSA AND DMCA ARE CONTENT-NEUTRAL AND THE
COURTS SHOULD DETERMINE THEIR CONSTITUTIONALITY AS SUCH
As noted above, intellectual property owners have a variety of laws
at their disposal to protect their assets.29 The DeCSS cases highlight
the uncertainty surrounding distribution of a circumvention device
that is based on the proprietary information of another, and is used to
access copyrighted materials.299 While the cases are distinguishable
because different laws were applied in each case, the two judgments
also show that intellectual property law is not yet settled with respect
to free speech rights in the digital age."'
Although the Second Circuit and the California Court of Appeal
applied different laws, both courts had to decide whether CSS and
DeCSS are "speech" within the meaning of the First Amendment. 1
294. Id. at 457. The court further noted that while it recognized that the injunction
prohibited Corley from linking to the entirety of any sites containing DeCSS,
including any protected speech on those sites, "those who maintain the linked sites
can instantly make their protected material available for linking by Corley by the
simple expedient of deleting DeCSS from their web sites." Id. at 457 n.32. This
"simple expedient" would, of course, help stop the further spread of DeCSS via the
Internet.
295. Id. at 457-58.
296. Id. at 458. ("[l~t is not for us to resolve the issues of public policy implicated by
the choice we have identified.").
297. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
301. Id. at 446; DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338, 347,
review granted, 41 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2002).
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The courts agreed that CSS and DeCSS are forms of speech which
required them to consider the First Amendment in determining the
scope of protection that could be granted to the intellectual property
owners.112 Despite agreeing on this point, however, the California
court held that under the UTSA, a preliminary injunction barring
Bunner from posting DeCSS was improper." In contrast, the Second
Circuit believed it was appropriate to prohibit Corley from both
posting, and providing links to, DeCSS because the DMCA is a
content-neutral regulation of speech.3'"
The basis for the disparate outcomes in the DeCSS cases lies, in
large part, with each court's treatment of the First Amendment's
impact on the distribution of DeCSS. The Second Circuit, which
decided the case against Corley about two weeks after the California
Court of Appeal handed down its decision,"" explicitly noted this
difference of opinion: "We have considered [Bunner]. To the extent
that [it] disagrees with our First Amendment analysis, we decline to
follow it."3"6 This disagreement may stem from the Bunner court's
failure to address whether the UTSA is content-based or content-
neutral.
The Corley decision included a determination that the DMCA is
content-neutral, and this established the scope of First Amendment
protection available to Corley's conduct." 7 The Bunner court,
however, did not address the issue of whether the UTSA was content-
based or content-neutral at all. However, such an evaluation must be
made for a court to weigh properly the rights of intellectual property
owners such as the DVDCCA.t' This oversight led the California
Court of Appeal to conclude that the UTSA "must bow to... the
First Amendment"3"9-a conclusion that was based on an incomplete
analysis of the UTSA and that was therefore incorrect. While this
deference to the First Amendment appears at first blush to be
appropriate, it is misguided. Had the Bunner court not omitted the
crucial step of asking if a given regulation is content-based or content-
neutral, it would have found that the UTSA is content-neutral. This
omission tipped the scales in favor of the defendant without giving
proper weight to the rights granted the DVDCCA by the UTSA. The
California Court of Appeal essentially deemed the UTSA
unconstitutionally overbroad."" This part shows that the court's
302. Corley, 273 F.3d at 445, 449-50; Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348.
303. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 351.
304. Corley, 273 F.3d at 455, 457.
305. The Second Circuit decided Corley on Nov. 28, 2001, Corley, 273 F.3d 429, and
the case against Bunner was decided on Nov. 1,2001, Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338.
306. Corley, 273 F.3d at 455 n.29.
307. Id. at 453-54.
308. See supra notes 153-65 and accompanying text.
309. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 349.
310. Id. at 350-51.
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determination was incorrect. This part argues that both the UTSA
and DMCA are content-neutral regulations of speech. This part then
explains why both laws are constitutional under the Supreme Court's
standard of review for content-neutral regulations.
A. Computer Code and Computer Programs Are Forms of Speech
Protected by the First Amendment
Courts should perform a two-step analysis to determine whether a
law encroaches on First Amendment rights.3 1 The first step is to
decide if the questioned activity is one covered by the First
Amendment.31 z If the activity is not sufficiently expressive, it is not
protected by the First Amendment. If the activity does meet this
threshold requirement, it is speech protected by the Constitution. The
second step, then, is to examine the law to determine whether it is
content-based or content-neutral.313
As for the distribution of DeCSS as speech, one critic of the Corley
decision has contended that instructions, such as those of computer
code, have "traditionally received the highest level of First
Amendment protection, ' 314 but this criticism is inaccurate. As
discussed earlier,3 5 teaching someone to do an illegal act is not a form
of speech protected by the First Amendment.316  Therefore, if the
intent is to encourage others to do something illegal, that intent may
be considered in determining the First Amendment's impact on
restrictions of such speech.
In cases dealing with computer programs such as CSS and DeCSS,
courts may also consider the functionality of the programs and how
they will be used in determining whether they are "pure speech" or a
combination of expressive and non-expressive elements. 317  In its
discussion of computer code and computer programs, the Corley court
311. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
:312. See supra note 156-57, 161 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 161, 277-80 and accompanying text.
314. Recent Case, 115 Harvard L. Rev. 2042, 2045 (2002).
315. See supra notes 150, 269-73 and accompanying text.
316. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
317. For a description of how courts determine the scope of protection available to
computer programs, see Hitchcock and Needleman, supra note 50, at 563-67; see also
Sableman, supra note 213, at 1327. Sableman argues that "intent and context do
matter," and that the Universal cases are property viewed as "'linking-plus' cases, not
'linking' cases.... [T]he defendant was held liable because it did more than just post
Internet links." Id. According to Sableman, the "plus" in the Universal cases was
Corley's "active encouragement of downloading and use of the DeCSS utility." Id.
For this reason, Sableman argues that Corley's precedent should not apply to linking-
only cases. Id. Both the California trial court and the Reimerdes court made note of
the defendants' attitudes about using DeCSS. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd sub nom. Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); DVD Copy Control Ass'n v.
Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338, 344, review granted, 41 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2002).
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performed such an analysis..31 The court said, "[i]n considering the
scope of First Amendment protection for a decryption program like
DeCSS, we must recognize that the essential purpose of encryption
code is to prevent unauthorized access. 31 9 Relying on Supreme Court
precedent, 321 the Second Circuit held that DeCSS's functional
capabilities "must inform and limit the scope of its First Amendment
protection. 3 2 Sometimes, though, a program is shared with others in
order to evaluate the program.3 2
If the defendant is sharing the program to encourage discussion of
technological issues, such a purpose may weigh in favor of granting
the speech greater First Amendment protection.323 However, if the
program is intended to be used without significant human interaction,
that fact should favor the property owner.324 If a computer program is
intended merely to perform a task, it is primarily functional, as
opposed to expressive.2 5  This intermingling of expressive and
functional, or speech and non-speech, elements in posting DeCSS326
complicates matters, but does not render the issue unsolvable.3 27 In
318. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 452-53 (2d Cir. 2001).
319. Id. at 452.
320. Id. at 453. The Second Circuit relied on Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367,386 (1969).
321. Corley, 273 F.3d at 453.
322. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
323. See Recent Case, supra note 314, at 2047 (suggesting that "[s]trict scrutiny
should apply when the primary purpose of posting or linking to code is expressive").
324. See id. at 2048 (stating that "[dliminished scrutiny should apply to the
distribution of computer code intended to be executed rather than read").
325. See Scott W. Pink, Publishing in the Digital Age, 15 Transnat'l Law. 305, 308
(2002). Likewise, in assessing a defendant's linking activities, courts may consider
how such links work. The Reimnerdes court did just that, noting that the links on
Corley's web site that "automatically commence the process of downloading DeCSS"
were clearly violative of the DMCA, so too were the ordinary links, as it could be
presumed that once directed to the site containing DeCSS, the end user would
download the program. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d
294, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd sub norn. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273
F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). But see Sableman, supra note 213, at 1324-26. Sableman
argues that by looking at intent, the Reimerdes court inappropriately focused "on the
background, prior acts, and apparent intent of the defendants and their links" and
"viewed and analyzed the links at issue as part of an overall pattern of conduct ...
[that] met the standard for derivative liability." Id. Nonetheless, Sableman concludes
that "intent and context do matter." Id. at 1327; see also supra note 324.
326. See Corley, 273 F.3d at 451. The Bunner court found that the defendant's
activities were "'pure' speech." Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348. This finding may
have been due in part to the fact that the DVDCCA did not allege that Bunner
engaged in expressive conduct, even though the DVDCCA did argue that DeCSS's
functionality should limit the level of First Amendment protection available to it. Id.
at 347-48; see also Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 49, at 62-63 (observing that "if trade
secret law is viewed from the perspective that it makes certain conduct unlawful, any
attempt by a trade secret owner to prohibit third-party disclosure of a trade secret is
merely an attempt to prohibit conduct, not speech" (footnotes omitted)); see also
Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 49, at 4 n. 19.
327. See supra notes 99, 151-64, 278 and accompanying text.
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fact, the issue is in many respects no more complex than in earlier
cases dealing with First Amendment defenses when the expressive
activity at issue had both speech and non-speech elements.32 s
In any case, based on precedent, both the Second Circuit and the
California Court of Appeal held that computer code and computer
programs are sufficiently expressive to merit First Amendment
protection.3 29  Given these precedents, as well as the Bunner and
Corley decisions themselves, it does not seem plausible to claim that a
computer program such as DeCSS is so lacking in expressive elements
that it falls beyond the scope of the First Amendment's reach. With
this step in the analysis complete, this Comment now turns to the
challenged laws -the UTSA and the DMCA.
328. See supra notes 151-63, 278 and accompanying text. In addition, some believe
that the defendants in the DeCSS cases shared the program "with political
motivation." Ryan Christopher Fox, Old Law and New Technology: The Problem of
Computer Code and the First Amendment, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 871, 875 (2002). But see
Bruce Ledewitz, Civil Disobedience, Injunctions, and the First Amendment, 19 Hofstra
L. Rev. 67 (1990). Ledewitz defines civil disobedience as "expressive conduct even
the participants admit is not protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 67-68.
Moreover, according to Ledewitz's definition, the "deliberate destruction of valuable
property" is not civil disobedience. Id. at 70 n.15. This is because "unlike the sit-in,
the arrest does not restore the object of the protest to his former condition." Id.
Whether Bunner or Corley were engaging in "true" civil disobedience, however, may
not affect the analysis, as such a motive could not provide them with immunity. As
Judge Kaplan wrote in Reimerdes,
[C]omputer code is not purely expressive any more than the assassination of
a political figure is purely a political statement.... [Code's] expressive
element no more immunizes its functional aspects from regulation than the
expressive motives of an assassin immunize the assassin's action.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 304. The tenuousness of the "political motivation"
defense is evidenced by its proponents' attempts to draw distinctions between
Bunner's and Corley's conduct and that of those who spread computer viruses. One
commentator has argued that while the widespread distribution of DeCSS warrants
protection because of its "political" underpinnings, the creators of the Michelangelo
computer virus of the early 1990s did not deserve such immunization from
punishment "even if the virus was specifically designed with the intent of some sort of
misplaced political protest.... The level of harm and damage done in [that] case is so
great that it would outweigh even a substantial expressive nature in the code." Fox,
supra, at 882-83. This analysis seems to rest on an assumption that DeCSS is
harmless, despite the threat that it poses to copyright owners. See supra note 13 and
accompanying text. The National Research Council described this assumption:
[T]he widespread use of digital information and networks has created
increased opportunities for ordinary people to engage increasingly in acts of
infringement that are difficult to detect, yet mount up. The availability of
this technology has bred a mind-set that seems to regard all copyrighted
works as available for the taking without paying compensation.
Nat'l Research Council, supra note 1, at 132-33.
329. Corley, 273 F.3d at 445, 449; Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
B. The UTSA and DMCA Are Content-Neutral
According to the Supreme Court's decision in Ward v. Rock Against
Racism,33  "[t]he principal inquiry in determining content
neutrality.., is whether the government has adopted a regulation of
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys." '331
According to Ward, "[t]he government's purpose is the controlling
consideration." 332
1. The UTSA Is Content-Neutral
Based on Ward, the UTSA is a content-neutral regulation. That is,
the UTSA's purpose of protecting the proprietary information of
intellectual property owners, 33 a purpose the Bunner court itself
acknowledged, 334 is "unrelated to the content ' 335 of the speech it
regulates. Therefore, the UTSA's prohibition of speech is permissible
if, under Ward's intermediate level of scrutiny, it is "narrowly tailored
to serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral interests.
36
a. The UTSA Is "Narrowly Tailored"
The California court's basic premise for its judgment seems to be
that the UTSA goes too far in its attempt to protect intellectual
property.337 The Bunner court said that the UTSA is overbroad
because it "prohibits even speech that is scholarly, addresses
legitimate concerns, and seeks no profit for the speaker. '3   This is
inaccurate. The UTSA provides only that "[a]ctual or threatened
misappropriation may be enjoined. '339 Based on the Act's definition
of misappropriation,34 discussing the technology of a copy protection
system is lawful so long as the trade secret itself is not disclosed. In
addition, the UTSA gives courts discretion to fashion suitable
remedies in misappropriation cases.3 1 The California trial court in
Bunner did just that in its preliminary injunction through two
provisions. First, the court did not enjoin Bunner from providing links
to other web sites containing DeCSS.342 Second, and contrary to the
330. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
331. Id. at 791 (emphasis added).
332. Id.
333. See Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 346; see also supra note 55 and accompanying
text.
334. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 346.
335. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
336. Id. at 798; see also supra notes 164, 287 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 240-43 and accompanying text.
338. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 350.
339. Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.2(a) (West 1997) (emphasis added).
340. Id. § 3426.1(b); see also Lemley & Volokh, supra note 55, at 229-30.
341. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3426.2, 3426.3 & 3426.5.
342. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 344; see also supra note 218 and accompanying
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appellate court's admonition of the UTSA's overbreadth,343 the trial
court expressly permitted "discussion, comment [and] criticism [of
CSS], so long as [CSS] is not disclosed or distributed."3" The trial
court's ability to narrowly tailor relief to the DVDCCA without
restricting discussion of CSS belies the appellate court's contention
that the UTSA is overbroad.345 In addition, trade secret laws such as
the UTSA protect First Amendment rights through their narrow
definitions of trade secrets and misappropriation, which include
exemptions for "independent derivation" and reverse engineering.346
The Bunner court also expressed concern with the UTSA's
protection of trade secrets "for a potentially infinite period of time." '347
While it is theoretically possible that a trade secret will last forever,348
reliance on trade secrecy law for protection may be risky because
there is always the possibility that the trade secret will be discovered
through either "independent invention or reverse engineering.
3 49
Alternatively, if the trade secret is otherwise disclosed to the relevant
industry, the information will no longer be protected as a trade
secret.35 Once a trade secret becomes widely known through one of
the above scenarios, the information contained in that trade secret is
"immediately available for wider use."
351
Therefore, due to the fragile nature of trade secrets, "courts
routinely grant injunctions against [their] continued unauthorized
disclosure.., regardless of whether the secret was initially obtained
text.
343. See supra notes 235-38 and accompanying text.
344. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 344.
345. It is also worth noting that the Court of Appeal treated a preliminary
injunction as a prior restraint. Id. at 350. In actuality, the two are not necessarily
synonymous, at least not in the context of trade secrets. See supra notes 66 and 133.
In fact, the definition used by the court shows this. The court defined a prior restraint
as "an administrative or judicial order 'forbidding certain communications when
issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur."' Bunner, 113
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 350. The speech at issue in Bunner had already occurred; the
DVDCCA only wanted to enjoin further speech that would disclose DeCSS. The
Court of Appeal misconstrued the purpose and meaning of preliminary injunctions.
Preliminary injunctions preserve the status quo and prevent further harm to plaintiffs.
See Luten, supra note 66, at 456. They are an ideal tool for intellectual property
owners such as the DVDCCA to protect their proprietary assets during the pendency
of a trial. Preliminary injunctions are granted before a full trial on the merits, but this
does not make them a prior restraint. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. In
addition, the trial court's refusal to enjoin discussion of CSS and DeCSS allowed
Bunner's right to discuss CSS and DeCSS to remain intact, while preventing the
further disclosure of the DVDCCA's trade secret. Such an injunction would have a
de minimus effect on Bunner's free speech rights, if any effect at all.
346. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
347. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 350.
348. See Cundiff, supra note 18, at 81.
349. Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 49, at 61.
350. Id.
351. Cundiff, supra note 18, at 81.
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lawfully or unlawfully. 352 These elements of the UTSA show that the
law is narrowly tailored. The next question is whether the UTSA
serves legitimate government interests.
b. The UTSA "Serves the Government's Legitimate, Content-Neutral
Interests"
The UTSA protects trade secrets by making their disclosure illegal.
By its very nature, this prohibition of disclosure regulates speech.
Thus, while the UTSA's purpose is not to regulate speech,353 the act
nonetheless "has an incidental effect on ' 354 speakers such as Bunner
who disclose trade secrets.355 Under Ward, such an incidental effect
does not make the UTSA content-based. 6 This is because the
California legislature's intent in enacting the UTSA was not to
regulate discussion of CSS or any other topic, but to regulate the
disclosure of trade secrets.357 Moreover, the UTSA's prohibition of
the disclosure of CSS as a trade secret is "justified without reference
to the content of regulated speech." '358 The justification for the
UTSA-as for many other intellectual property laws-is its protection
of valuable property.359 The UTSA prohibits the disclosure of all
trade secrets, no matter what form that disclosure takes, and no
matter whether the trade secret is a computer program, blue print, or
written words. The UTSA is therefore content-neutral. If the
California Court of Appeal had applied an analysis similar to the
foregoing, it would have discovered that a preliminary injunction
barring Bunner's disclosure of DeCSS was appropriate. This
Comment now describes the Second Circuit's analysis of the DMCA
in the case against Corley.
2. The DMCA Is Content-Neutral
Unlike the California appellate court, the Second Circuit
recognized that it is proper to vary the level of scrutiny applied to laws
affecting First Amendment rights based on whether the regulation is
content-based or content-neutral. The Second Circuit's decision is
352. Id. at 80.
353. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
354. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
355. See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 49, at 63 ("[Any limitations on speech
rights are simply unavoidable consequences of the necessity of preserving a trade
secret.").
356. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 ("A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the
content of the expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some
speakers or messages but not others." (emphasis added)).
357. Id. (holding that a law adopted "because of disagreement with [a] message" is
content-based); see also supra note 55 and accompanying text.
358. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703,720 (2000).
359. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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based on this understanding. According to the Second Circuit,
because the DMCA is content-neutral, an intermediate level of
scrutiny is applied to Corley's First Amendment claims.
3611
In evaluating Corley's free speech defense, the Second Circuit
explicitly noted that the scope of First Amendment protection is not
uniform for all types of expression. 36 1 The court held that computer
programs are speech,36z but at the same time recognized that their
functionality gives computer programs a non-speech element.363
Having recognized this functionality, the Second Circuit was able to
consider Corley's free speech rights in the proper context.
The court held that the functionality of CSS and DeCSS is not
speech under the First Amendment. 364 This fact led the court to
conclude that the government's purpose in regulating the use of
DeCSS and other decryption devices through the DMCA was
content-neutral.365  The court then determined that the injunction
prohibiting Corley from posting or linking to DeCSS did not burden
more speech than necessary, and therefore upheld the District Court's
order.366 Generally speaking, the Second Circuit's decision was
proper. Courts must be exact, however, in describing the distinction
between content-based and content-neutral laws. In its opinion in
Corley, the Second Circuit reached the right result in barring Corley
from further distributing DeCSS, but the court did misstate some of
the concepts pertaining to the interaction between intellectual
property rights and content-based and content-neutral laws.
3. The UTSA and DMCA Are Content-Neutral Even Though the
Content of the Expression Is Considered
According to the Corley court, "the scope of protection for speech
generally depends on whether the restriction is imposed because of
the content of the speech. ' 367 This proposition is similar to Corley's
argument that the DMCA was content-based because it "targeted"
DeCSS.36 8  Corley was right when he made this argument:369  the
DMCA prohibits the circumvention of protection systems, 370 and
DeCSS circumvents protection systems. It does not follow, however,
that the DMCA is content-based.
360. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 454, 456 (2d Cir. 2001).
361. Id. at 446; see also supra note 264 and accompanying text.
362. Corley, 273 F.3d at 447.
363. Id. at 451; see also supra notes 39, 317-27 and accompanying text.
364. Corley, 273 F.3d at 454.
365. Id.; see also supra Part II.B.3.
366. Corley, 273 F.3d at 455-57.
367. Id. at 450.
368. Id. at 454; see also supra notes 282-85 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 282-85 and accompanying text.
370. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
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In evaluating the content-neutrality of intellectual property laws
such as the DMCA, courts should consider not only whether the law
applies to the speech in question because of the content of the speech,
but also if the law's purpose is to prevent discussion of the idea-or
"message"-embodied in the speech.371 The legislatures' neutrality
toward the "message" embodied in DeCSS is evidenced by what the
DMCA and the UTSA do not prohibit, such as reverse engineering,
independent creation and research.372 Ideas about CSS and DeCSS
can still be expressed through these channels. The UTSA and DMCA
merely prohibit the disclosure of CSS and the trafficking of DeCSS,
respectively. These prohibitions inherently affect speech.373 That is,
for each law to serve effectively those interests unrelated to the
suppression of free speech, speech may nonetheless be affected
because the only way to disclose and traffic in DeCSS is to
communicate it to another.3 74 Such effects, however, do not transform
an otherwise content-neutral law into a content-based law.375
To determine whether the disclosure of certain information
misappropriates a trade secret, or whether a computer program
circumvents access controls, it is as a matter of course necessary to
look at the content of the speech. The UTSA and DMCA are
"content-based" only insofar as the courts must determine if the
information-the content of the speech-disclosed is in fact a trade
secret, or if the program-again, the content of the speech-really
does circumvent access controls. The concern with such content is not
the content's message. The concern is rather with the conduct-the
non-speech elements-that are inextricably linked to the content, i.e.,
the misappropriation of a trade secret or the circumvention of access
controls. The Second Circuit in Corley expressly recognized that the
purpose of the DMCA was to prohibit action, not speech: "The
Government seeks to 'justif[y]'... the DMCA... solely on the basis
of the functional capability of DeCSS to instruct a computer to
decrypt CSS."376 When message and conduct are linked, courts must
extricate the seemingly inseparable speech and non-speech elements
in judging whether a law violates First Amendment rights.3 77 As cases
such as Spence v. Washington378 and United States v. O'Brien37 9 show,
this is not an impossible task.3',"
371. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
372. See supra notes 57, 113 and accompanying text.
373. See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 49, at 21-22, 63.
374. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
375. Id.
376. Corley, 273 F.3d at 454 (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000))
(emphasis added).
377. See supra notes 153-64 and accompanying text.
378. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
379. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
380. See supra notes 154, 159 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
When an otherwise prohibited act is defended on First Amendment
grounds, courts must weigh the countervailing interests of the right to
free speech and the government's intent in regulating the act in
question. Speech (or, more broadly, expressive conduct) may be
enjoined by courts when the legislature seeks to achieve a goal
unrelated to the restriction of speech.
Some laws require courts to evaluate a defendant's speech to
determine whether the speech violated a plaintiff's intellectual
property rights. Courts must be entirely clear that an evaluation of
such speech does not make such laws content-based. The Second
Circuit commented that restrictions imposed on speech because of its
content are deemed content-based.38" ' Under Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, however, courts are to consider regulations based on speech's
message to be content-based.382 It may be too easy for other courts to
interpret the Second Circuit's comment to mean that all intellectual
property laws are content-based despite such laws' neutral rationale,
and despite the Second Circuit's later clarification of what makes a
law content-based.383 Just as one cannot claim that yelling "fire" in a
crowded theater is an act protected by the First Amendment, one
cannot seek First Amendment protection for making illegal copies of
movies.
381. Corley, 273 F.3d at 450.
382. Ward V. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,791 (1989).
383. Corley, 273 F.3d at 454.
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